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Introduction
Trade unions have been important players in Romanian economic, political
and social life since the overthrow of the Ceau~escu regime in December
1989.1 When communist control disappeared, Romanian workers enthusi-
astically created new trade unions and restructured the pre-existing ones.2
As a result, union density has remained relatively high.3 Even though
much of the developing private sector is non-union, organized labor will
continue to exert a powerful influence over both politics and the economy.
Labor unions play an important role as one of the "social partners" under
1. See generally Larry S. Bush, Collective Labor Disputes in Post-Ceau~escu Romania,
26 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 373 (1993) (discussing trade union activity in Romania from
December 1989-1992).
2. See id. at 386-87.
3. No reliable figures exist on trade union density. Trade union leaders notoriously
inflate their membership numbers. A recent leading treatise on Romanian labor law has
adopted the trade unions' claims, concluding (albeit somewhat skeptically) that
Romanian trade union membership numbers approximately seven million workers
(including five million dues payers), out of a workforce of about 10 million. See SANDA
GHIMPU & ALEANDRU TICLEA, DREPTUL MUNcu 87 (Casa de EditurA §i PresA "$ANSA"
S.R.L. 3d ed. 1997). An edited English translation of an earlier version of this text can be
found in Sanda Ghimpu & Alexandru Ticlea, Romania, in Ir'L ENCYCL. FOR LAB. L. &
INDUsT. REL. 178 (Roger Blanpain ed., 1996 supp.).
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Romanian legislation,4 and they also dominate the state sector (including
state-owned enterprises, or their privatized successors), a key component
of the Romanian economy.
Given the ongoing power of organized labor, developing a workable
industrial relations system is crucial to Romania's future. An effective sys-
tem requires a fair, coherent legal structure for the exercise of collective
labor rights that commands the respect and adherence of both employers
and workers. In addition, given Romania's ambitious plans to join the
European Union,5 the system must comply with the international labor
standards prevailing in Europe. Romania has already adopted many of
these standards.6
The Romanian model of labor relations that has evolved since 1989 is
a study in contradictions. While the current model fosters grass-roots
organization and accommodates trade union pluralism at all levels, it also
retains powerful influences from the communist system of centralized
labor relations, especially vis A vis collective labor contracts. Even the most
recent collective bargaining legislation presumes a centralized, hierarchical
structure of legally-binding contracts, beginning at the national level and
extending through the industrial sectors (or "branches") to the enterprises.
This Article provides an overview and critique of two fundamental
areas of current Romanian labor law - trade union organization and col-
lective bargaining.7 This Article recommends several approaches to harmo-
nizing Romanian law with prevailing international standards, using the
model of labor relations that the Romanians have chosen.
4. In addition to their role in collective bargaining under the statutes that are the
subject of this article, "social partners" (i.e., workers' and employers' representative orga-
nizations) act as central players in salary indexing, establishing the national minimum
wage, advising on proposed labor legislation, and mediating large-scale industrial dis-
putes. See, e.g., Lege privind Organizarea i Funclionarea Consiliului Economic i
Social, No. 109, July 2, 1997, Monitorul Oficial al Romfniei [hereinafter M.O.], Part I,
No. 141, July 1997 (statute establishing an Economic and Social Council, composed of
representatives of the leading trade union confederations and employer associations)
[hereinafter Law 109/1997].
5. Cf. Agenda 2000: Commission opinion on Romania's application for member-
ship of the European Union, BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Supp. 8/97.
6. Romania has ratified many of the treaties prepared under the auspices of the
Council of Europe, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, together with its 11 protocols. As of October 1998,
it had signed, but not ratified, the Revised European Social Charter, which contains
many worker rights articles. Romania is a member of the International Labor Organiza-
tion and has ratified 37 ILO conventions, including: Freedom of Association and Protec-
tion of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 87]; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) [herein-
after ILO Convention No. 98]; Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135);
Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144);
and, Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).
7. The regulation of collective labor disputes is beyond the scope of this article.
The author addressed this subject several years ago; see generally Bush, supra note 1, at
373. At the time of this writing, Romania's parliament is considering a proposal that
would make fundamental revisions to its collective labor disputes law.
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I. Romanian Labor Law - Background, Current Structure and
Conflicts with International Standards
Romania's contemporary labor relations practices, and the laws that imple-
ment them, were first hammered out in the chaotic months following Nico-
lae Ceau~escu's overthrow in December 1989. In the turbulent period
from 1990-92, trade unions arose as major political players, often opposing
the government and at times even threatening the regime's existence. 8 The
laws adopted to regulate this burgeoning labor movement combined com-
munist-era and pre-communist Romanian legal concepts with new theories
influenced by Western European (especially French) labor models.
Romania's post-communist legal framework for labor relations was
put in place in 1991. The framework was based on the new Constitution,9
together with three statutes - Law 13/1991 (Law on the Collective Labor
Contract);10 Law 15/1991 (Law on the Settlement of Collective Trade Dis-
putes);1 and Law 54/1991 (Law on Trade Unions). 12 In 1996, a more
sophisticated collective negotiations statute replaced Law 13/1991; 13 it
was subsequently amended in 1997.14 Also in 1996, Romania established
a tripartite Economic and Social Council, which was given consultative
responsibility regarding the nation's labor laws, as well as mediation duties
in collective labor disputes at industry and national levels. 15
Notwithstanding the creation of extensive new labor relations legisla-
tion, the communist-era Labor Code of 197216 has neither been repealed
8. See id. at 387-400. Cf. VLADIMIR PASTi, THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSITION: ROMANIA
IN TRANSITION 262-85 (1997) (arguing that the enterprise technocracy is the effective
power in Romania and that this group had succeeded in eliminating the trade unions as
serious competitors for power by 1992).
9. CONSTITUTIA DIN 1991 [hereinafter 1991 CONST.]. An English version of the Con-
stitution may be found in Gisbert H. Flanz, Romania, in CONSTITUTIONS OF COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992).
10. Lege privind contractul colectiv de munch, No. 13, Feb. 8, 1991, M.O., Part I,
No. 32, Feb. 9, 1991 [hereinafter Law 13/1991]. The Romanian text, together with Eng-
lish and French translations, of this and other cited labor statutes promulgated prior to
1993 are available in 7 PARLIAMENT OF ROMANIA, ROMANIAN LEGISLATION: LABOUR AND
SOCIAL PROTECTION (M.O., 1993).
11. Lege pentru solulionarea conflictelor colective de munch, No. 15, Feb. 11, 1991,
M.O., Part I, No. 33, Feb. 11, 1991 [hereinafter Law 15/1991].
12. Lege cu privire la sindicate, No. 54, Aug. 1, 1991, M.O., Part I, No. 164, Aug. 7,
1991 [hereinafter Law 54/1991].
13. Lege privind contractul colectiv de munch, No. 130, Oct. 1996, M.O., Part I, No.
259, Oct. 24, 1996 [hereinafter Law 130/1996].
14. Lege pentru modificarea §i completarea Legii nr. 130/1996 privind contractul
colectiv de muncA, No. 143, July 24, 1997, M.O., Part I, No. 172, July 1997 [hereinafter
Law 130/1996 (1997)]. Law 130/1996, as amended, was republished in M.O., Part I,
No. 184, May 19, 1998. Discussion and citations in this article regarding Law 130/
1996 will be to the amended version, as republished, unless otherwise noted.
15. See Law 109/1997, suprd note 4. At the time of this writing, Parliament has
before it a draft law, "Lege privind solutionarea conflictelor de munca," intended to
replace Law 15/1991, supra note 11, and to establish a new framework for regulating
collective labor disputes.
16. Codul Muncii al Romaniei, Law No. 10, Nov. 23, 1972, Buletinul Oficial, Part I,
No. 140, Dec. 1, 1972. For an annotated version of the Code, in Romanian, containing
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nor comprehensively revised, 17 except to the extent that it has been super-
seded by specific provisions of subsequent labor and employment statutes
or by the 1991 Constitution. Consequently, the regulation of individual
employment contracts still remains based in large part on the 1972 Labor
Code. 18
A. The Romanian Constitution of 1991
Any assessment of contemporary Romanian labor relations law begins with
the 1991 Constitution. It established a social democratic republic19
wherein the state "is obliged to take measures for economic development
and social protection which will ensure that citizens will have a decent
standard of living."20 Romanians' constitutional rights include free state
education,21 health care,22 and "the social protection of labor" (i.e., safety
and health, minimum wage, time off, paid vacations, special provisions for
work under difficult conditions, an eight hour day, equal pay for women
and men for the same work),23 as well as special protection for families, 24
children,25 and the disabled.26
Although the Constitution establishes Romania as "a market econ-
omy"27 and protects the right to private property,28 the state retains a cen-
tral role in overseeing the national economy. 29 Moreover, the Constitution
commentary and modifications through early. 1994, see UNIUNEA JUR15TILOR DIN
RoMAmA, CODUL MUNCH ($erban Beligradeanu annot. 1994).
17. The current government hopes to revise the labor code at some point within the
next few years. See Interview by Larry S. Bush with Alexandru Athanasiu, Minister of
Labor and Social Protection, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Strada Demetriu I.
Dobrescu, No. 2, Bucharest, Romania (Mar. 13, 1997).
18. Cf. UNIUNEAJUR15TILOR DIN RoMANLA, supra note 16, at V-IIX.
19. 1991 CONST., supra note 9, art. 1.2-1.3 ("1.2. The form of government of the
Romanian state is the republic. 1.3. Romania is a social and democratic state of law in
which human dignity, the rights and liberties of citizens, the free development of the-
human personality, justice, and political pluralism represent supreme values and are
guaranteed.").
20. Id. art. 43.1.
21. See id. art. 32.
22. See id. art. 33.
23. See id. art. 38.2.
24. See id. art. 44.
25. See id. art. 45.
26. See id. art. 46.
27. Id. art. 134.1.
28. See id. art. 41.
29. The state is expected to ensure:
a) free trade, protection for loyal competition, the creation of a favorable frame-
work for the utilization of all production factors;
b) the protection of national interests in economic, financial, and currency
activity;
c) the stimulation of national scientific research;
d) the exploitation of natural resources in accordance with the national interest;
e) the restoration and protection of the environment, as well as the preservation
of ecological balance;
f) the creation of the necessary conditions for improving the quality of life.
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mandates state control over a wide array of productive assets. 30
The 1991 Constitution gives trade unions an important place in
Romania's social democracy. Article 37 ["The Right to Associate"] confers
on Romanians an express constitutional right to form trade unions, 3 1 and
Article 9 ["Trade Unions"] defines their function.3 2 The Constitution also
expressly protects Romanians' right to bargain collectively and to strike.
Article 38.5 ["Labor and the Social Protection of Labor"] states that "[tihe
right to collective bargaining and the binding nature of collective agree-
ments are guaranteed."3 3 Article 40 ["The Right to Strike"] confers the
right to strike, albeit with vague statutory limitations unspecified in the
Constitution.34
Several constitutional articles that address the relationship between
Romania's treaty obligations and its municipal law could affect the inter-
pretation and validity of Romania's labor laws. According to Article 11.1
["International Law and Domestic Law"], "[t]he Romanian state pledges to
fulfill, to the letter and in good faith, its commitments under the treaties to
which it is a party."3 5 Article 11.2 then provides that "[t]he treaties ratified
by Parliament, according to the law, are part of domestic law,"'36 thereby
See id. art. 134.
30. For example, Article 135.4 provides:
Underground resources of any type, lines of communication, air space, water
resources that can produce power or can be used in the public interest, beaches,
the territorial sea, the natural resources of the economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf, as well as other assets as defined by law, are exclusively state property.
Id. art. 135.4. These public properties "are nontransferable." Id. art. 135.5. Even before
approval of the 1991 Constitution, Romanian statutes had identified "other assets" that
were to be "exclusively state property." For example, in Law 15/1990, "State-owned
Enterprise Restructuring," state enterprises were divided into "autonomous companies"
("regie autonome") and "commercial companies"("societatea comerciala"). The autono-
mous companies were to be "organized and operate within the economy's strategic
branches (e.g., the armament industry, the power industry, mining and natural gas
exploitation, the mail system, and railway transports) as well as in other fields of activity
established by the Government." Law 15/1990, M.O., Aug. 8, 1990, art. 2. The autono-
mous companies were also to stay in government hands; only the commercial societies
were to be privatized. See Law 58/1991, "The Commercial Companies Privatization
Law," M.O., Aug. 16, 1991.
31. 1991 CONST., supra note 9, art. 37.1 ("Citizens may freely associate in political
parties, trade unions, and other forms of association.").
32. Id. art. 9. Specifically, Article 9 states "[t]rade unions are set up and carry out
their activity under the conditions of the law. They contribute to the protection of the
rights and the promotion of the professional, economic, and social interests of
employees."
33. Id. art. 38.5.
34. "1. Employees have a right to strike to protect their professional, economic, and
social interests. 2. The law sets the conditions and limits for the exercise of this right as
well as the guarantees required for providing essential public services." Id. art. 40.
The "law" that implements Article 40.2 is Law 15/1991, supra note 11, which was
promulgated almost a year prior to adoption of the Constitution. For an extended dis-
cussion of Romania's regulation of collective labor disputes and strikes under Law 15/
1991 through 1992, see Bush, supra note 1, at 402-19.
35. 1991 CONST., supra note 9, art. 11.1.
36. Id. art. 11.2.
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transforming Romania's international obligations into municipal law.3 7
Human rights treaties, as part of municipal law, are accorded superior
status vis-A-vis other, purely Romanian, municipal law. Article 20 ["Inter-
national Human Rights Treaties"] states:
1. Constitutional provisions on the rights and freedoms of citizens shall be
interpreted and applied in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and with other treaties and pacts to which Romania is a
party.
2. If there is disagreement between the pacts and treaties on fundamental
human rights to which Romania is a party and domestic laws, then interna-
tional regulations will have priority.3 8
Given that Article 20.2 allows international human rights law to pre-
empt domestic law and that Romania has agreed to uphold trade union
and collective activity rights in several treaties,3 9 this Article - together
with Articles 11 and 20.1 - is potentially relevant to the future develop-
ment of Romanian labor law. Romania's constitutional obligation to
enforce these "human rights" as a form of "higher law" within its municipal
legal system suggests that Romanian courts could arguably reject domestic
law in favor of conflicting treaty-based standards such as those found in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms or Romania's ILO treaty obligations.
40
B. The Major Labor Relations Statutes
1. Regulation of Trade Union Organization and Operation
a. Trade Union Law up to the Communist Era
Trade unions in the modern sense arrived in Romania toward the end of
the nineteenth century. 4 1 Collective bargaining came to Romania later
than it did to Western Europe, in large part because Romania was an over-
whelmingly agricultural nation. Interest in trade unions grew quickly,
however, as the socialist movement attracted adherents: by 1920 there
37. For a general discussion of the relationship between international and municipal
law, in Western European states and elsewhere, see OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
§§ 18-21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
38. 1991 CONST., supra note 9, art. 20.
39. See, e.g., treaties listed supra note 6.
40. According to one Romanian commentator, Romanian law below the level of the
Constitution that conflicts with human rights treaties to which Romania is a party can
be declared inapplicable, but not abrogated, by public authorities, including the courts
(except the Constitutional Court). Such decisions by the courts would be effective inter
partes litigantes but not erga omnes, i.e., stare decisis is not consistent with Romania's
civil law legal theory. Moreover, "politico-legal" international documents other than
treaties (see, e.g., U.N. Resolutions, ILO Declarations) could be used to interpret internal
Romanian law, but not to declare it inapplicable. Finally, customary international law
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights should be treated the same as
human rights treaties. See Corneliu-Liviu Popescu, L'application des Normes de Droit
International Relatives aux Droits de l'Homme en Droit Roumain, 8 RavuE EUROPEENE DE
DRoIr PUBLIC 351 (1996).
41. The first workers' organization was the Asocialiei Generale a tuturor lucrdtorilor
din RomAnia, founded in 1872. See GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra note 3, at 83.
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were 146 trade unions with over 90,000 members.42
While statutes protecting minors and women had been in place as
early as 1885, 43 and attempts to formulate a comprehensive legislative
social policy began as early as 1909, modern industrial relations law first
appeared after World War I.44 The first comprehensive regulatory frame-
work for trade unions was the "Law About Professional Trade Unions, 4 5
promulgated in 1921 during a relatively democratic period in pre-World
War II Romania. 4 6 This was a progressive statute, granting to all "peo-
ple.., who practice the same professions, [or] similar or connected profes-
sions, the right to constitute themselves in a free fashion into professional
trade unions, without needing any prior authorization,"4 7 albeit with
mandatory court-supervised registration.4 8
Unfortunately, the rights guaranteed by the 1921 Trade Unions Law
were progressively eroded in the following decade. By the 1930s, Romania
was caught up in the fascist convulsions then sweeping central Europe.
The country lapsed into a royal dictatorship in 1938, prompting the repeal
of the 1921 Trade Unions law and its replacement by a much more restric-
tive royal decree.4 9 The short-lived royal dictatorship was followed by the
authoritarian regime of Marshal Antonescu, who eliminated trade unions
entirely.5 0
Trade unions subsequently reappeared following the 1944 overthrow
of Antonescu.51 In January 1945, while still independent of Moscow, 5 2 the
Romanian government passed a new "Law About Professional Trade
Unions - Law 52/1945."53 In most respects it reinstated the principles,
42. See id.
43. See id. at 17.
44. See id.
45. Lege Asupra Sindecatelor Profesionale, Decree No. 2.207, April 24, 1921, M.O.,
No. 41, May 26, 1921 [hereinafter 1921 Trade Unions Law].
46. See STEPHEN FISCHER-GAtA , TwENTIErH CENTURY RoMANIA 36 (1970). Ironically,
this law was promulgated during the regime of General Alexandru Averescu, a conserva-
tive war hero with a reputation for hostility toward organized labor. See id. at 35-38.
47. 1921 Trade Unions Law, supra note 45, art. 2.
48. See id. arts. 5-16. This Article does not extensively discuss the 1921 statute;
much of it was re-enacted in a 1945 law that in turn was the basis for much of the 1991
statute currently in force. See infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text.
49. See George G. Crisan, Trade Union Movement in Romania 9 (October 1955)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
50. See id. at 12. Antonescu kept Romania allied with the Axis powers for most of
world War II. See, e.g., FISCHER-GALATI, supra note 46, at 63; Vi-AD GEORGESCU, THE
Rom t ANrs: A HISTORY 210-22 (1991) (originally published in Romanian as IsToRIA
ROMANILOR: DE LA ORIGINI PINA LA LILELE NoAsT E (1984).
51. For an overview of this period, see GEORGEScU, supra note 50, at 207-32. On
August 23, 1944, the young king, Mihai, led a coup d'etat overthrowing the Antonescu
regime. Romania then joined the Allies in a fruitless effort to avoid Soviet occupation.
Essentially abandoned by the Western powers, Romania sank quickly into the Soviet
sphere of influence.
52. The Soviets installed a puppet government in Bucharest in March 1945, allowing
the communist party to progressively achieve a complete takeover. See id.
53. Legea Nr. 52 Asupra Sindicatelor Profesionale, Decree No. 150, Jan. 20, 1945,
M.O., No. 17, Jan. 21, 1945 [hereinafter Law 52/19451.
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and often the exact language, of its 1921 predecessor. Its structure and
contents also inspired much of the current Law 54/1991 and thus merit
further examination.
Law 52/1945 authorized free association into trade unions with rela-
tively few restrictions.5 4 In order to acquire legal personality, trade unions
were required to (1) be composed of at least fifteen members;5 5 (2) com-
plete the registration process before the designated court where the trade
union was headquartered; 5 6 and (3) formulate bylaws ("statutul") that con-
formed to statutory requirements. 57 They also were required to have a
leadership committee composed of five to twenty-five members,5 8 the
majority of whom had to be Romanian citizens. All leaders had to possess
full civil rights and had to have been "practicing the profession in a real
fashion for at least one year prior to the time of their election."59 Finally,
none of the leaders could have been convicted of certain specified
crimes.60
A trade union acquired "legal personality" on the date that the court
registered it. 6 1 Unregistered organizations did not exist in the eyes of the
law and possessed no statutory privileges. 62 Trade union leaders who
functioned on behalf of such "nonexistent" entities were subject to severe
criminal penalties, namely fines and imprisonment of six months to two
years.63
A trade union with legal personality could represent its interests, or
those of its members, in legal proceedings where the rights in question
"result[ed] from laws, regulations, [or] collective or other contracts that are
consistent with the exercise of the profession and with the collective inter-
54. Like its 1921 predecessor, the law provided as follows:
There is recognized for all natural persons who work in the same professions,
similar or connected professions the right to constitute themselves in a free fash-
ion into professional trade unions, without needing any prior authoriza-
tion... No one can be forced to take part, not take part or stop taking part in a
professional trade union against his will.
Id. art. 2. The statute allowed government employees and minors with professional
qualifications to unionize without prior authorization. See id. arts. 3, 4. It also con-
tained stiff penalties for persons proven to have interfered with the rights of free associa-
tion through violence, threats, refusals to hire or dismissals, gifts or promises.
Punishment could include fines and imprisonment from six months to two years. See id.
art. 43.
55. See id. art. 1.
56. See id. arts. 5-16. The court was expected to take into account the opinion of the
Ministry of Labor regarding whether it approved the trade union's acquisition of legal
personality. See id. arts. 7-8.
57. See id. art. 18. One of the legal requirements was that "[t]he rights of every
member to political and religious freedom cannot be in any way affected by the provi-
sions of the bylaws." Id. art. 18.d.
58. See id. art. 20.
59. Id. art. 21.
60. These crimes included: abuse of trust, embezzlement of public funds, extortion,
fraud, larceny, concealing stolen goods, bribe-taking or counterfeiting. See id.
61. See id. art. 13.
62. See id. art. 31.
63. See id. art. 44.
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ests of the members or for the interests of the profession."64 In addition, a
trade union could acquire property, start businesses, establish mutual aid
societies and pensions, and publish materials "for the cultural or technical
development of its members or for the defense of professional interests,
without the need of any prior authorization." 65 Finally, the statute granted
trade unions "the right to designate delegates chosen from their members
to all institutions and organs" that discuss, resolve, or guide "questions of
professional, economic or cultural interest for employees, in which their
professional and economic interests must be represented. '66
The foregoing rights applied to all "professional trade unions" that
acquired legal personality, a category that included organizations of arti-
sans and other self-employed persons. Its provisions, therefore, were not
intended solely to benefit the wage-earning "employees" of modern indus-
trial or commercial enterprises. The statute conferred additional rights on
wage earners, however, when they created "professional trade unions of
workers and of employees in private offices."67 These organizations were
expressly empowered to negotiate collective labor contracts "either with
isolated employers, or with associations of employers .... "68 They also
had the right to designate delegates to conciliation and arbitration commis-
sions established under an earlier law69 to resolve collective labor con-
flicts. 70 Together with representatives of employers' organizations and the
government, these trade unions were also allowed to participate in work
site inspections under labor protection laws and regulations, in administer-
ing the laws regarding vocational schools and technical training, and in the
operation of public placement services. These private sector "employee"
trade unions were further empowered to administer social assurance pro-
grams (when accredited by the Ministry of Labor), to establish labor
exchanges for their members, and (at the enterprises where their members
worked) to take "within the limits of the law, any kind of action for defend-
ing and guaranteeing the professional interests of its members."71
Law 52/1945 provided that the union's bylaws would govern the rela-
tionship between the trade union and its members.72 Members could with-
draw from the union without giving a reason, but the trade union could
claim any dues owed. 73 If approved by the leadership committee of the
64. Id. art. 25.
65. Id. arts. 26, 27, and 29.
66. Id. art. 30.
67. Id. arts. 32, 33.
68. Id. art. 32.
69. Lege pentru regulamentarea conflictelor colective de muncA, Decree No. 8.703,
Sept. 4, 1920, M.O., No. 122, Sept. 5, 1920.
70. See Law 52/1945, supra note 53, art. 32. The trade union delegates did not have
to be employees of the enterprise in the conflict. The trade union could name such
delegates as long as one third of the employees interested in the conflict belonged to the
trade union, provided that a majority of all of the employees interested in the conflict
accepted those delegates. See id.
71. Id. art. 33 d-f.
72. See id. art. 34.
73. See id. art. 35.
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trade union, resigning members could keep all of the economic or "mutual
aid" rights they had possessed in trade union enterprises to which the
member had contributed through dues or otherwise. 74 Members could be
dismissed from the trade union by the leadership committee, with a right
of appeal to its general assembly.75 Finally, the statute expressly provided
that a "member of a professional trade union, who accepts working condi-
tions inferior to those stipulated in the collective contract, can be excluded
from the trade union."76
Trade unions ("sindicati"), which were local in character under Law
52/1945, could join together to form unions ("uniuni," the equivalent of
modern federations) as long as they were in the same professional cate-
gory; in turn, two or more "unions" could form a confederation. 77 These
higher level bodies could obtain legal personality as long as the constitut-
ing organizations at the next lower level had complied with the law's provi-
sions governing the creation of local trade unions.78
All of the provisions in Law 52/1945 directed toward trade unions also
applied to these "unions" and confederations. 79 Having obtained legal per-
sonality, such higher-level organizations could "designate persons empow-
ered to negotiate in the name of the affiliated trade unions with employers
or with employers' associations, or on conciliation and arbitration commis-
sions, to resolve collective labor disputes, to conclude collective labor con-
tracts and to represent the affiliated trade unions or 'unions' on all
occasions."80
Even though much of Law 52/1945 was substantially identical to its
1921 predecessor, it deviated sharply from the older law in one notable
respect: Article 28 of the new law authorized the creation of factory (or
enterprise), committees, which represented "the professional interests of all
the employees" before enterprise management.81 The committees were to
be composed of three to thirteen members elected by a majority vote of the
assembly of all the employees in the enterprise; the vote could be secret if
one-fifth of the employees present so demanded. 82
74. See id. The requirement that the trade union leadership approve of the retention
of these benefits was added in 1945 to an article that was, in all other respects, a direct
carryover from its predecessor. See 1921 Trade Unions Law, supra note 45, art. 32.
75. See Law 52/1945, supra note 53, art. 36. As with member resignations, the 1945
statute gave broader decision-making power to the leadership committee than did the
1921 version. See id. art. 35. In the earlier statute, dismissals were effected by the gen-
eral assembly of the trade union, with a right of appeal to the "tribunal" (essentially an
appellate court). See 1921 Trade Unions Law, supra note 45, art. 37.
76. Law 52/1945, supra note 53, art. 37.
77. See id. art. 46.
78. That is, they had to convene general assemblies, conform to the provisions of
Law 52/1945 that regulated the contents of ordinary trade union bylaws (arts. 17-19),
and obtain legal personality from the court, which would enter the higher-level trade
union organization into the official register. See id. art. 47.
79. See id. art. 49.
80. Id. art. 48.
81. Id. art. 28. These "professional interests" included working conditions, salary,
morale, and cultural interests.
82. See id.
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b. Trade Unions During the Communist Era
The communists quickly seized the factory committees as a major instru-
ment of their control. The secret vote safeguard provided for in Law 52/
1945 was frequently ignored, allowing the communists to dominate com-
mittee membership. According to one observer of the period, beginning in
September 1945:
Under the [Frontul Unic Muncitoresc - United Workers Front] auspices a
network of the workshop committees (factory committees) was created in
plants and factories, which became the main instrument of propaganda,
channel of control of the industrial production, and center of the organisa-
tion of new trade unions under the communist control. They enjoyed the
confidence of the Soviet occupation forces. Everybody who opposed their
aims, political parties, government and rival social and labor organizations
came under the attack of the communist press, meetings and mass demon-
strations .... The activity of the factory committees was manifold. They
immediately attacked the management. Owners and managers were
threatened with denouncement to the Soviet occupation forces as truce sabo-
teurs. Whosoever dared to say anything against the factory committee was
doomed to be attacked by all means including physical coercion and
beating.83
Law 52/1945 remained in force, albeit in modified form, throughout
the communist era; it was repealed only in 1991, following the enactment
of Law 54/1991.84 Factory or enterprise committees, and later "workers'
councils," along with trade unions, remained an integral part of the struc-
ture of labor relations and Party control throughout this period.85
The role of trade unions was modified significantly under the commu-
nist regime, which viewed them as institutions intended to further the poli-
cies of the state rather than the interests of their members. 86 The regime
expected trade unions to cooperate with central and communal institu-
tions, workers' councils, and the managers of the enterprises. 8 7 Through
their activities, trade unions were directed by law to "contribute to the
83. Crisan, supra note 49, at 16-17. According to Ghimpu and Ticlea, these factory
committees existed as early as September 1944 before passage of Law 52/1945, when
the communists established the Central Commission of the United Unions Movement,
which in turn promoted the creation of factory committees. See GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra
note 3, at 84.
84. "Law No. 52/1945 on professional trade unions with its subsequent modifica-
tions as well as any other contrary provisions shall be abrogated." Law 54/1991, supra
note 12, art. 51.
85. See MICHAEL SHAFIR, ROMANIA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIETY; POLITICAL STAG-
NATION AND SIMULATED CHANGE 58 (1985).
86. For example, according to the 1972 Labor Code:
The trade unions mobilize the masses for accomplishing the program of the
Romanian Communist Party of building a new society, developing sustained
activities to raise labor productivity and the superior quality of production, pro-
moting technical progress, raising the level of training of working people, rigor-
ously respecting discipline in production, and fulfilling the duties that are
incumbent upon every employed person.
SANDA GHIMPU ET AL., DREPTUL LA MUNCA: CODUL MUNCII COMENTAT $I ADNOTAT 620
(1988), art. 165(1).
87. See id. arts. 167, 168, and 170.
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development of the socialist consciousness of those who work, in the spirit
of the materialist outlook on the world and society, to the cultivation of
moral features corresponding to ethical principles and socialist and com-
munist equities" and "to concern themselves with the good organization
and judicious use of the free time of working people, collaborating closely
with other communal organizations and with specialized bodies."8 8
There was no trade union pluralism under the communists. Rather,
there was a strict hierarchy of trade union organizations beginning at the
top with the central General Union of Romanian Trade Unions (UGSR),
followed by branch organizations, groups of enterprises organizations and
enterprise trade unions.8 9 The entire structure was subjugated to the polit-
ical control of those in power.90
c. Law 54/1991
Romanian workers and the new trade unions they created after December
1989 generally were committed to trade union pluralism and independence
from the state. They were also opposed to institutionalizing anything that
resembled factory committees or worker's councils. 9 1 The provisions
authorizing such entities were therefore omitted in the 1991 law; trade
unions alone represented workers in the new system.9 2 From 1991 to
1996, however, Law 13/1991 required many workplaces to elect ad hoc
employee delegates for collective negotiations and thus muddied this pic-
ture considerably. 93
88. Id. art. 166.
89. See id. art. 164 ("Trade unions are professional organizations which are consti-
tuted on the basis of the right of association provided by the Constitution and function
on the basis of the statutes of the General Union of Romanian Trade Unions, of branch
trade unions and of enterprise trade union organizations."). See also GHIMPU & TICLEA,
supra note 3, at 85.
90. See GHIMPU & TIcLEA, supra note 3, at 86; see also SHuAM', supra note 85, at 101-
02.
91. See Bush, supra note 1, at 383 n.45. See also Peter Siani-Davies, Popular Mobilisa-
tion During the Romanian Revolution: The Case of the National Salvation Front Local
and Enterprise Councils 10-15 (unpublished paper presented at the Third International
Congress on Romanian Studies, Cluj, July 1-6, 1997; on file with the author) (arguing
that many of the enterprise councils formed in December 1989 andJanuary 1990 "were
a radical grass roots manifestation of the revolution" that was eclipsed largely as a result
of official disfavor).
92. This contrasts with the practice in Western Europe, where works councils or
their equivalent are very common. See M. Biagi, Forms of Employee Representational Par-
ticipation, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAv AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MAR-
KET EcONoMIEs 315-51 (R. Blainpain & C. Engels eds., 1993). It also differs from several
of Romania's Central European neighbors, notably Hungary. See L. Nagy, Transforma-
tion of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Hungary, in LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: FROM PLANNED TO A MARKET ECONOMY 67,
79-81 (R. Blainpain & L. Nagy eds., 1996); Csilla Kollonay Lehoczky & Mdria Lad6,
Hungary, in NEv PATTERNS OF COLLECnvE LABOUR LAw IN CENTRAL EUROPE: CZECH AND
SLovAK REPUBLICS, HUNGARY, POLAND 101, 128-31 (Umberto Carabelli & Silvana Sciarra
eds., 1996) [hereinafter NEW PATTERNS OF COLLECTrVE LABOUR LAw].
93. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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Law 54/1991 currently regulates the creation and operation of
Romanian trade unions. Under it, trade unions may be formed when at
least fifteen "[plersons having the status of employee,"9 4 or fifteen
"[p]ersons who are lawfully and individually exercising a trade or profes-
sion, or who are associated in co-operatives as well as in other professional
classes,"9 5 wish to create one - a standard directly adopted from Law 52/
1945. No one can be compelled to join or refrain from joining a trade
union,9 6 but a person can be a member of only one trade union at a time.9 7
The right to unionize is denied only to those "holding management func-
tions or functions involving the exercise of State authority" in specified
state and local governmental bodies, and to public prosecutors, judges, and
military personnel.9 8
Trade unions can be organized on an enterprise, industry, profession,
or territory basis. 99 Enterprise-based unions form the dominant model.
Two or more trade unions in the same industry or profession may join to
form a federation.' 0 0 In turn, two or more federations from different
branches can form a confederation, which is intended to operate at the
"national" level.1' 1
By law, trade union organizations must be "apolitical," existing "for
the purpose of protecting and promoting the professional, economic,
social, cultural and sporting interests of their members, and their rights,
provided in the legal texts on labour matters and in the collective labour
contracts."'1 2 They are to be independent of the State, political parties and
"any other organizations." 10 3 Trade unions have the right to establish their
own regulations, organize their activities, and elect their representatives,
without intervention by "[p]ublic and administrative authorities." 10 4
Trade union leaders may be elected only from among "Romanian citi-
zens who are members of the trade union with full rights, working in the
94. Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 2(1), (2).
95. Id. art. 4. Ghimpu and Ticlea point out an apparent discrepancy between Article
9 of the 1991 Constitution, which speaks only of "employees" in describing the role of
trade unions, and Article 4 of Law 54/1991, which extends the right to unionize to
people practicing a craft or profession as self-employed individuals or as members of a
cooperative. Noting that, among others, peasants, writers and lawyers had all formed
trade unions by 1993, they concluded that the Constitution spoke in general terms and
did not intend to restrict the right to form trade unions to "employees." Thus, they saw
no need either to amend the Constitution or to declare Article 4 of Law 54/1991 uncon-
stitutional. See GHIMPU & TicLEA, supra note 3, at 91-92.
96. See Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 2(3).
97. See id. art. 2(4).
98. See id. art. 5.
99. See id. art. 42(1).
100. See id. art. 42(2).
101. See id. art. 42(3).
102. Id. art. 1(1). The requirement that trade unions be "apolitical" has been contro-
versial, given that state ownership of much of the economy means that what might
otherwise be purely economic issues are inevitably political to a greater or lesser extent.
Cf. GHIMPU & TIcLEA, supra note 3, at 99.
103. Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 1(2).
104. Id. art. 8(1),(2).
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enterprise," and who are not subject to certain criminal penalties 10 5 -
another direct borrowing from Law 52/1945. Pensioners and persons
from outside the enterprise may be hired as trade union employees, but
only to perform "specialized functions which require a superior
qualification."' 0 6
The law protects trade union leaders from constraints upon the exer-
cise of their duties.10 7 Leaders' individual employment contracts with
their enterprise receive limited protection for up to one year after leaving
office,' 08 as do their rights to retain their position and seniority. 10 9 Lead-
ers are entitled to up to five days release time per month from their enter-
prise duties in order to handle trade union matters.110
Law 54/1991 expressly authorizes trade unions to engage in bargain-
ing, mediation, conciliation, petitioning, protests, demonstrations, and
strikes "under conditions specified by law.""' The unions may use the
courts and administrative bodies to defend their members' rights arising
from labor laws and collective agreements. 112 In addition, Law 54/1991
specifies that trade unions may acquire property, support their members'
exercise of their profession, establish mutual insurance funds, print publi-
cations, set up cultural, teaching and research bodies, establish commer-
cial enterprises and banks, and borrow money.113
Trade unions, by law, have consultation and information rights.
Enterprise boards of directors are required to invite trade union representa-
tives to their board meetings "in order to discuss matters of professional,
economic, social, or cultural interest."114 The trade unions have a right to
obtain information, presumably from the enterprises whose workers they
represent, "necessary for negotiating the collective labor contract as well as
for the formation and utilization of funds designed for improving working
conditions, for labor protection and social uses, [and for] social insurance
and protection."' 15
Trade union federations and confederations may assist their affiliated
105. Id. art. 9.
106. Id. art. 34(2).
107. See id. art. 10.
108. See id. art. 11.
109. See id. art. 12.
110. See id. art. 35.
111. Id. art. 27(1). In 1993, the author participated in appellate arguments concern-
ing a subway strike in Bucharest. Cf. Conflictul de munca de la Metrou este sau nu este
legal?, RoMANIA LIBER, June 26, 1993. In reply to the author's arguments supporting the
legality of the Metro Workers's strike, the Metro enterprise's lawyer cited the provisions
of Article 27(1), claiming these required trade unions to invoke the enumerated proce-
dures in strict order. According to this interpretation, a strike would be illegal if the
trade union had not first attempted to bargain, then to mediate or conciliate, then to
petition, and finally to protest and demonstrate prior to initiating a walkout. The court
did not adopt this reading of the statute, although it did rule the strike illegal on other
grounds.
112. See Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 28.
113. See id. arts. 23-25.
114. Id. art. 29(1).
115. Id. art. 29(2).
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trade unions in dealings with enterprise management.' 16 In addition, con-
federations "at the national level shall be consulted.., at the drawing up of
the drafts of normative acts regarding labor relations, collective labor con-
tracts, [and] social protection as well as of any other regulations referring
to the right of association and to trade union activity." 1 17
To establish a lawful trade union and acquire legal personality, the
founders must draw up a "statute" that satisfies the criteria set out in Law
54/1991.118 In addition, they must file a registration application "with the
court of first instance in whose jurisdiction the headquarters of the trade
union lie." 1 9 The court will examine the application to confirm that the
necessary documents have been provided and that the trade union's forma-
tion and statute conform to the law.120 The court will then issue a rea-
soned decision accepting or rejecting the application. 12 1 A rejection
decision can be appealed. 122 The court of first instance is required to keep
a special register containing basic information about the trade unions reg-
istered in its jurisdiction. 123 Subsequent modifications to the trade
union's statute, as well as changes in its leadership body, must be commu-
nicated to the registering court.12 4 A trade union acquires legal personal-
ity on the date the registering court's decision to approve the application
becomes final.125
d. Disparities Between Law 54/1991 and International Labor Standards
. "House" Trade Unions
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 98, to which Romania is a party, guaran-
tees trade unions protection from employer domination or control:
1. Workers'. . . organizations shall enjoy adequate protection against any
acts of interference by [employers' organizations] in their establishment,
functioning, or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of
workers' organizations under the domination of employers or employers
organizations, or to support workers' organizations by financial or other
means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of
employers or employers' organizations, shall be deemed to constitute acts of
interference within the meaning of this Article. 126
116. See id. art. 31.
117. Id. art. 27(2).
118. See id. arts. 6-8.
119. Id. art. 15. Romania is divided, for administrative purposes, into 40 "judets"
(counties) and the city of Bucharest. Each of these administrative units has at least one
court of first instance, known as a "judicatoria."
120. See id. art. 16(1).
121. See id. art. 16(3).
122. See id. art. 17.
123. See id. art. 18.
124. See id. art. 21.
125. See id. art. 19.
126. ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 6, art. 2. Compare National Labor Relations
Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(1994) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer.., to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it. .. ").
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Romanian law does not specifically regulate employer-dominated
trade unions, which, in Romanian vernacular, are called "house" or "yel-
low" trade unions. Article 1(2) of Law 54/1991 does state, however, that
"[t]rade unions shall be independent of State bodies, political parties and
of any other organizations."12 7
According to Romanian trade union leaders, employer-dominated
trade unions are a widespread problem.128 Enterprise managers allegedly
create or dominate "house" trade unions both to complicate the collective
bargaining process and to make it easier to obtain favorable agreements.
Given the prevalence of trade union pluralism in Romanian enterprises, 12 9
bargaining at that level would include both independent trade unions and
any existing "house" trade unions.130
127. Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 1(2) (emphasis added). Since 1992, the
national-level collective labor contracts have contained a clause that obliquely addresses
the problem of employer-dominated unions. The clause provides that "the employer will
adopt a neutral and impartial position towards the trade unions and the representatives
of the employees in the enterprises and institutes." 1992 National Level Collective Labor
Contract, negotiated by Fratia, CNSLR and Cartel Alfa, art. 98(2).
128. See Larry S. Bush, Report: Worker Rights and Labor Law Seminar, Free Trade
Union Institute, Saturn, Romania, 12-19 August 1995 1113, 4 (unpublished report on
seminar for Blocul National Sindical (BNS), a national confederation, on file with the
author). The report had this to say about pluralism and "house" trade unions:
3. Romanian collective bargaining and trade union organization laws permit
representation of the same unit of workers by multiple unions and also permit
the creation of employer-dominated company unions .... The trade union lead-
ers at the seminar accepted the principle of multi-unionism (doubtless a practi-
cal stance, given that BNS must fight for its existence against other
confederations, some of which seem to have more influence with the Govern-
ment and the ruling parties). The experience with collective bargaining in a
multi-union context is mixed. On the one hand, in the metal industry, where
there are six BNS federations and five other federations affiliated with either
CNSLR-Fratia or Cartel Alfa, there is a history of successful cooperation in
jointly negotiating collective bargaining agreements. On the other hand, in
Romtelecom, where there is a BNS affiliate and one from CNSLR-FrAtia, the two
sides have had great trouble cooperating and the BNS federation's president said
that his rivals were very close to management and tried to undermine his
federation.
4. The trade union leaders were very concerned about the company unions,
however. Romanian law does not prohibit company-dominated unions ....
The union leaders did not seem particularly interested in considering amend-
ments to the law to outlaw them. Again, this appears to be a concession to
reality; since most trade unions are dependent upon the enterprise for financial
and other support, many of the labor organizations that are actually independ-
ent would feel threatened if there were such a law. Rather, the trade union lead-
ers focus on that portion of Law 54/1991 that permits the creation of a trade
union with only 15 members. They believe that by increasing this minimum
number to some (unspecified) higher figure many of the problems with com-
pany unions would be solved.
Id.
129. See GHIMPU & TicLEA., supra note 3, at 103.
130. After Law 130/1996 took effect, "house" unions wishing to participate in collec-
tive negotiations would have to meet the new standard for "representativity" (i.e., repre-
sent at least one-third of the workers, or be affiliated with a representative federation or
confederation). See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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Employer domination of trade unions formed the basis for a 1991
complaint brought against the Romanian Government before the ILO Gov-
erning Body's Committee on Freedom of Association. The final decision in
the case contained a recommendation - the sternest sanction available -
that the Romanian government modify its new Law 54/1991 to prohibit
such domination.131 Despite this ruling, Law 54/1991 was not revised.
The number of "house" trade unions in Romania is difficult to gauge
due, in large part, to the lack of objective information on the problem.
Trade union officials inflate the estimates by failing to distinguish between
employer domination and trade union competition, sometimes castigating
rival organizations as "house" unions, whether or not they are actually con-
trolled by the employer.
Interestingly, even leaders of genuinely independent trade unions
show little interest in amending Romanian law to implement the ILO stan-
dard and to expressly outlaw employer-dominated trade unions. This lack
of interest probably derives from the reliance of most enterprise-level trade
unions (including those that are, for all practical purposes, "independent")
on the enterprise for varying degrees of financial (and other) support.1 32
Presumably, some leaders fear that the explicit incorporation of the ILO
standard into Romanian law might place their independent organizations
at risk of dissolution. 133
ii. Requirement that Trade Union Members and Officers be Enterprise
"Employees"
Under Law 54/1991, only "[p]ersons having the status of employee shall
enjoy the right to organize themselves into trade unions .... -"134 Eligibility
131. See Complaint against the Government of Romania presented by the Interna-
tional Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), Report Nos. 278 (interim)
and 279 of the Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO Official Bulletin Vol. LXXIV,
1991, Series B, Nos. 2 and 3 (Case No. 1571). In the second of these reports, issued
after the promulgation of Law 54/1991, and taking into account its provisions, the ILO
Governing Body approved the Committee's reiterated "recommendation on the necessity
to ensure adequate protection against acts of interference by employers in workers' orga-
nizations and requests [to] the Government to adopt legislative provisions to that effect."
Paragraph 422(e), Report No. 279.
132. See Bush, supra note 128, at 2. Employer financial and material support for trade
unions has been institutionalized at the highest level. The national-level collective labor
contract in effect through May 1998 specified that:
(1) Enterprises will ensure on their property, free for the activity of the trade
unions, space and necessary furniture, as well as access to enterprise office
equipment (fax, copiers and other things of an administrative nature); the condi-
tions of access to these will be established by collective labor contracts.
(2) Cultural-sporting facilities, owned by the enterprise or by the trade unions
within the enterprise, respectively, can be used, without payment, for actions
organized by the trade unions or the employer, under conditions provided by the
collective labor contract.
Art. 89, Contractul Colectiv de Munch Unic la Nivel Naional, M.O., Part V, No. 2, Feb.
20, 1998.
133. See supra note 128.
134. Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 2(1). This statement must be qualified, how-
ever, insofar as the law also permits "persons ... associated in cooperatives as well as in
other professional classes" to form trade unions. See id. art. 4.
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for election to trade union leadership is limited, in turn, to "Romanian citi-
zens who are members of the trade union" and who are "working in the
[enterprise]. ' 135 Romanian trade unionists believe that enterprise manag-
ers use this "employee status" requirement to deny trade unions the right to
speak for unemployed or retired persons affiliated with or employed by the
enterprise. 136 More problematically, managers have also exploited the
requirement by refusing to recognize trade union leaders as the representa-
tives of their organization following the discharge of the employees by the
enterprise. 137
In either of the above cases, the "employee status" requirement argua-
bly conflicts with ILO standards on freedom of association. Article 2 of
Convention No. 87 expressly states that "[w]orkers... without distinction
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and.., to join organizations of
their own choosing without previous authorization."'138 This has been
interpreted, by the ILO Governing Body's Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation, as meaning that national law cannot restrict trade union member-
ship to the employees of a single employer. 13 9 It remains unclear, however,
whether the ILO standards would also prohibit domestic law from exclud-
ing people not currently employed (i.e., retirees and the unemployed) from
trade union membership.
Regarding trade union office holding, Article 3 of Convention No. 87
provides that "[w]orkers'... organizations shall have the right to ... elect
their representatives in full freedom."' 40 The ILO's Committee on Free-
dom of Association has frequently considered state limitations of eligibility
for trade union office to persons currently employed at the enterprise. The
ILO's position on this question is clear:
The requirement that employees must belong to the establishment in ques-
tion for election to trade union office is contrary to Article 3 of Convention
No. 87. It is necessary to admit as candidates for trade union office persons
who have previously been employed in the occupation concerned and to
exempt from the occupational requirement a reasonable proportion of the
135. Id. art. 9.
136. Ghimpu and Ticlea confirm that trade union membership rights are denied to
persons not currently employed: "Taking into account the provisions of Law 54/1991,
[since] the unemployed, pensioners (who have ceased work permanently), [and] high
school and university students may not join trade unions, [they] therefore do not pos-
sess trade union freedom." GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra note 3, at 92. Notwithstanding this
limitation, organizations calling themselves trade unions exist specifically for the unem-
ployed and some university students. See id.
137. Regarding restrictions on holding trade union office, see Bush, supra note 128, at
5 ("[T]rade union leaders who are discharged by their enterprise lose their right to be
recognized as leaders by that enterprise."). See also infra notes 141-42 and accompany-
ing text.
138. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 6, art. 2.
139. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF
THE ILO 53 (4th ed. 1996) ("The requirement for the establishment of a trade union that
workers need to be employees of only one employer is a violation of the principles of
freedom of association.").
140. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 6, art. 3.
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officers of an organization. 1 4 '
In 1995, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association addressed
Romania's standard in a case brought against the Romanian government
and its national railroad company (SNCFR) by the National Trade Union
Bloc (BNS) and its affiliate, the Engine Drivers' Federation. The case arose
in part from SNCFR's refusal to recognize discharged trade union leaders
as authorized representatives due to their non-employee status. 14 2 Acting
upon the Committee's recommendation, which found numerous violations
of ILO standards, the ILO Governing Body requested the Romanian Gov-
ernment amend portions of its labor legislation, including "the require-
ments to belong to the respective occupations to be eligible as trade union
leader."' 4 3 Nonetheless, to date the Romanian Government has not com-
plied with the ILO's request.
2. Regulation of Collective Bargaining
a. Collective Bargaining Prior to Law 13/1991
i. The Labor Contract Law of 1929
The first Romanian statute devoted to collective bargaining was passed in
1929,144 and was apparently inspired by both French and Italian legisla-
tion.145 It established the collective labor agreement as one of the recog-
nized forms of labor contracts, along with apprenticeship contracts,
individual employment contracts and "team" contracts. 146 The statute
defined "collective labor contract" as "the written agreement concerning
the conditions of work and payment, concluded on the one hand by one or
more entrepreneurs, or by groups or associations of them and, on the other
hand, by professional associations or groups of employees (wage-
earners)."'1 4 7
The 1929 Labor Contracts Law contrasts starkly with the communist
and post-communist era labor statutes in one major aspect. Whereas the
more recent statutes stress the power of representative bodies to bind
unconsenting workers and employers, the 1929 law was firmly grounded
in nineteenth century liberal notions of freedom of contract. No person or
entity was legally obligated to comply with a collective contract absent
141. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 139, at 80.
142. See Complaint against the Government of Romania presented by the National
Trade Union Bloc (BNS) and the Free and Independent Trade Union Federation of Train
Drivers of Romania (FSLIMLR), ILO Official Bulletin vol. LXXVIII, 1995, Series B, No.
297 (Case No. 1788) [hereinafter BNS/FSLIMLR Complaint].
143. Id. I 366(a).
144. Lege asupra contractelor de muncA, April 5, 1929, M.O., No. 74, April 5, 1929
[hereinafter 1929 Labor Contracts Law]. See also GH. BADICA & A. POPESCU, CONTRAC.
TUL COLECTIV DE MUNCA: SALA ZAREA $i IMPOZITAREA 35 (1991). An earlier law on the
organization of professional trade unions, passed in 1921, had envisioned the right of
workers to enter agreements with owners. See id.
145. See BADicA & PopEscu, supra note 144, at 35.
146. See 1929 Labor Contracts Law, supra note 144. The provisions regarding collec-
tive labor contracts were contained in Title IV of the statute.
147. Id. art. 101.
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some word or deed that could be said to constitute a manifestation of
assent. The only persons or entities that could be bound by a collective
labor contract were: (a) organizations that represented employers or work-
ers, if those organizations committed themselves to comply either at the
time the contract was created or by later adhesion; (b) individual workers
and employers who actually signed the contract, "as well as those who
g[a]ve [an] individual written mandate to negotiate in their name and for
them;" (c) workers and employers who did not resign from groups in cate-
gory (a) within eight days of learning of the creation of the collective labor
contract; (d) employers who formally adhered to the contract subsequent
to its creation; and (e) workers or employees who joined groups in category
(a).148
This relentless commitment to individual freedom of contract ran
throughout the 1929 Labor Contracts Law. There were no express provi-
sions for branch- or industry-level contracts as such, nor any mention of
national-level contracts. Multi-employer contracts could be applied only to
those employers who had manifested assent in one of the ways specified
above. Had a national-level contract been contemplated, compliance with
this requirement would have made universal coverage extremely unlikely.
I. Collective Bargaining Under the 1972 Labor Code
In contrast to the 1929 Labor Contracts Law's liberal freedom of contract
approach to collective bargaining,149 the communist-era labor code treated
collective labor contracts as simply one aspect of the "transmission belt"
role of trade unions - a means to ensure that the workers fulfilled the
economic plans established by the regime. The express purpose of enter-
prise-level collective contracts, set out in Article 76(1) of the 1972 Labor
Code, was "to contribute to superior organization of work, to reinforce[ I
discipline and mobiliz[e] . . . all efforts for fulfillment of the plan, [and] to
improv[e] conditions of work and life in the enterprises."150 The workers
and the enterprise management were expected to commit themselves,
through the collective contract, "to improving the capacity of production,
raising labor productivity, reducing specific expenditures and reducing the
cost price, as well as to obtaining economies and benefits above the
planned level, improving the quality of production, and raising the effi-
ciency of economic activity."151 In addition, collective contracts were
intended to provide the forms of worker remuneration and methods of
operating social investments (i.e., housing, creches, health unit dispensa-
ries, canteens and similar activities), as well as to promote cultural and
148. Id. art. 108. This article dealt specifically with contracts for an indefinite term.
The emphasis on individual assent was reinforced in another provision which delineated
who would be bound for the entire period of a definite term or "life of the job contract."
Id. art. 109. It was necessary to address these different types of contracts separately
because any party could denounce a contract of indefinite duration on 20 days' notice.
See id. arts. 115, 116.
149. The 1929 Labor Contracts Law, supra note 144, was repealed in 1950.
150. GHIMPU Er AL., supra note 86, art. 76(1).
151. Id. art. 76(2).
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sports activities.15 2
The 1972 Labor Code required collective labor contracts between the
enterprise and the "collective of workers" to be executed annually by the
leader of the enterprise and the president of the trade union committee. 15 3
While the law required all labor contracts be "debated and approved by the
general assembly of workers," 15 4 prior to its entry into force, this process
was unlikely to reflect individual worker assent. Once a contract entered
into force, its provisions applied to all persons employed at the
enterprise. 155
At the branch, or industry-wide level, ministries (as well as "other cen-
tral organs or economic centers") could enter into collective contracts with
trade union federations; such contracts would then apply to all of the enter-
prises and workers in that industry. 156 These contracts, which could be
effective for as long as five years, were intended "to [implement] the provi-
sions of the plan [and] the application of labor law; [to improve] conditions
of labor and life in the enterprises of the respective sectors, [and to imple-
ment] necessary measures with a view to achieving the collective contracts
of the enterprises."'15 7
Law 13/1991 superceded Articles 76-80 of the 1972 Labor Code.15 8
The drafters of Law 13/1991 did not revert to pre-communist legislation as
their model for collective labor contracts, however, as they had previously
done when drafting Law 54/1991.159 Rather, they rejected the freedom of
contract approach embodied in the 1929 Labor Contracts Law, opting
instead for a system similar to the 1972 Labor Code, i.e., striving for univer-
sal coverage.
b. Law 13/1991
Faced with major labor unrest in the early 1990s, the Romanian govern-
ment sought to draft trade union laws that would promote industrial stabil-
ity. By 1991, the threat posed by collective labor disputes (which had a
particularly political edge to them at that time) was the principal labor
relations concern of the ruling party. The major units of production were
state enterprises (private sector production was negligible), so economic
demands were inextricable from politics. Law 15/1991, which was created
to regulate collective labor disputes and strikes, was therefore designed to
confer the right to strike in principle only; it hedged the privilege with so
many substantive limitations and procedural hurdles that strikes (particu-
152. See id. art. 77(1).
153. See id. arts. 76(1), 77(2) and 78(1). The president of the trade union committee
acted as the representative of the workers' collective (i.e., all employees, without regard to
actual assent or voluntary membership in the trade union). See id.
154. Id. arts. 78(1) and 77(2).
155. See id. art. 78(1).
156. See id. art. 78(2).
157. Id. art. 78(2).
158. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 21.
159. See, e.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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larly political strikes) could be declared illegal or suspended.160
In turn, Law 13/1991 (companion legislation to the strike law) was
designed to assure that centralized national and industry-level collective
bargaining dominated the labor relations framework. It established a sys-
tem that could be controlled by those in political power at the center, at
least on the employers' side, but potentially even on the trade union side if
(as appeared possible in early 1990s) a single confederation established its
hegemony.16 ' Whether or not such a motive underlay the creation of this
"top-down" bargaining system, the hierarchical approach came naturally to
those charged with drafting Law 13/1991. After almost fifty years of cen-
tralized state planning, most Romanians had grown accustomed to the idea
that meaningful political and economic action had to begin at the top.
16 2
Law 13/1991 proved to be a crudely crafted piece of legislation,
fraught with conceptual defects and incapable of regulating the vigorous
trade union pluralism that quickly developed in Romania. 163 This led to a
crisis of legitimacy in regard to the status of collective labor contracts as
reliable sources of rights and obligations. One contributing factor to the
crisis was the fact that trade unions were barred, at least in theory, from
serving as the employees' representatives in most enterprises. The crisis
was also fueled by several other factors, including: uncertainty about the
status of the duty to bargain (i.e., was there a legally duty); the unsatisfac-
tory method of selecting employer and trade union representatives for
higher level bargaining; and the reality that competing collective labor con-
tracts could exist simultaneously at branch and national levels. The. exist-
ence of multiple, conflicting labor contracts posed serious questions about
whether any contracts at these levels could be legally binding. These
issues, as well as problems that trade unions experienced in enforcing
enterprise contracts, ultimately led to the passage of reform legislation -
Law 130/1996.
c. Law 13/1991's Problem Areas
i. Trade Union Pluralism and Employee Representation at the
Enterprise Level
Under Law 13/1991, collective labor contracts could be entered into at
four levels - enterprise, 164 groups of enterprises, branches of activity (i.e.,
160. See Bush, supra note 1, at 387-419 (assessing the background and import of Law
15/1991).
161. See id. at 383-87. The National Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania
(CNSLR), a successor to the old communist General Trade Union Confederation in
Romania (UGSR), was closely allied with the National Salvation Front, which controlled
the government both before and after the 1990 elections. See id. at 385.
162. The author once discussed with Dumitru Costin, the president of the National
Trade Union Bloc (BNS),'the advisability of putting a mandatory membership dues
deduction clause into enterprise-level collective contracts. Mr. Costin insisted that such
a clause would only be accepted if it was first put into the national level collective bar-
gaining agreement.
163. See Bush, supra note 1, at 383-87.
164. The Romanian word used in Law 13/1991 and other Romanian labor legislation
to refer to both business and government entities is "unitate," which means "[t]he small-
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industry level) and national. 165 A contract at any of these levels was "a
convention between employers and employees." 166 The "parties" to the col-
lective contract were said to "be equal and free in [its] negotiation,"' 67 with
the power to extend, 168 modify, 169 suspend, 170 or terminate' 7' the con-
tract. Carrying out the terms of the collective contract was "compulsory
for the parties"' 72 and failure to comply with the contractual obligations
would "involve the responsibility of those found guilty of it."1 73
One fundamental question that arose under Law 13/1991 concerned
the identity of these "parties." At the enterprise level, where the law envi-
sioned the creation of a single contract, rather than separate contracts for
each group of separately-represented workers, 174 Article 7(1) reiterated
that "the collective labor contract shall be concluded between the employer
est formation, economic, administrative, military, medical, etc., organization which
forms a whole and acts under a general plan." ACADEMIA RomANA, INSTITUL DE LINGVIS-
TicA "IoRGA IoRDAN", DEx: DICTIONARUL EXPLICATIV AL LiMBII ROMANE 1136 (2d ed. 1996)
[hereinafter DEx]. The word most accurately translates into English as "unit." ANDREI
BANTA, DIC-TIONAR ROMAN-ENGLEZ 425 (3d ed. 1995). This Article adopts an alternate
translation - "enterprise" - because it conforms to more generally accepted terminol-
ogy used in Western economies.
Another Romanian word, "ntreprindere," means an "[e]conomic unit of production,
service or commerce." DEX, supra, at 540. It is translated as "industrial unit" or "shop."
BANTA$, supra, at 228. "Intreprindere" is not used in contemporary Romanian legisla-
tion. A friend of the author, an experienced translator, suggested that the reason for this
might be that the word is associated with communist usage.
It would appear that neither "unitate" nor "Intreprindere" correspond precisely with
the Romanian terms for privately-organized business entities - "societate comercial" or
"societate pe actiune." It is therefore difficult to pinpoint whether the bargaining that
must occur at "enterprise ('unitate') level" refers to single site locations (roughly akin to
"bargaining units" in U.S. parlance), or is to be company-wide. In the public sector, the
Romanian national railroad, SNCFR, (a single legal entity prior to 1998), entered into
one nationwide collective contract with the trade union federations that represented its
employees throughout Romania. See BNS/FSLIMLR Complaint, supra note 142, I 319.
SNCFR was at one and the same time an enterprise and a "branch," it seems. Cf. IsA-
BELLE DESBARATS, L'ENTREPRISE A tTABLISSEMENTS MULTIPLES EN DROIT DU TRAVAIL (1996)
(discussing extensively the treatment of the concept of "enterprise" in French labor law).
165. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 6.
166. Id. art. 1 ("The collective labor contract shall be a convention between employers
and employees, stipulating clauses with regard to the working conditions, remuneration,
and other rights and obligations proceeding from labor relations, within the limits pro-
vided by the law.").
167. Id. art. 3. In negotiating the collective labor contract, however, the parties had to
"include clauses by which the mutual rights and obligations of the parties shall be estab-
lished, as regards the promotion of equitable labor relations of a nature to ensure the
social protection of the employees, the diminution or elimination of collective trade dis-
putes, or the calling of strikes." Id. art. 10.
168. Id. art. 9(2).
169. Id. art. 14(1).
170. Id. art. 13.
171. Id. art. 16.
172. Id. art. 13(1).
173. Id. art. 13(2).
174. This result was implicit in the statute, which mandated that once an enterprise
collective labor contract had been executed, its provisions bound all enterprise employ-
ees, "regardless of the date of their hiring or whether they were or were not affiliated to a
trade union organization in the enterprise." Id. art. 4.
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and the employees," 175 i.e., the "parties" identified in the basic definition
of the collective agreement set out in Article 1.
Law 13/1991 defined "employer" as "self-managed public companies,
trading companies, and the other legal or natural persons having employ-
ees." 176 The statute thus envisioned that virtually all private enterprises
and most public ones would be "employers" within the meaning of this
law.177 With one exception,178 the statute did not specify which officials
or individuals from management or the ownership of the enterprise were
authorized to negotiate on its behalf; presumably, however, this was merely
a question of determining who had such authority under Romanian com-
pany law.
Determining who held authority to speak for the employees was fre-
quently a more complicated matter. In theory, workers were to be repre-
sented by a single trade union during enterprise-level bargaining, as long as
all workers belonged to that trade union.179 However, most Romanian
enterprises of any size had multiple trade unions, so that it would be unu-
sual for every employee to be affiliated with the same trade union. Some
unions at a particular enterprise could be either independent or affiliated
to competing federations, with each purporting to speak on behalf of their
members.
Ubiquitous trade union pluralism, combined with the statutory right
not to join a trade union,180 conflicted with the model envisioned by Law
13/1991 - a single collective bargaining agreement per enterprise.
According to Dr. 5erban Beligradeanu, one of the most prolific commenta-
175. Id. art. 7(1).
176. Id. art. 19.
177. Under Romanian law in 1991, state enterprises were divided into "commercial
societies" and "autonomous regimes." "Commercial societies" are state-owned busi-
nesses engaged in commercial and other activities that in the U.S. would be performed
by private companies. These commercial societies were subsequently to be privatized.
"Autonomous regimes" involve activities intended to remain under state control, even
though many of their activities - mining, railroads, etc. - are in the private sector in
western nations. Following the 1996 elections, some of the autonomous regimes, such
as the telephone company, were also slated for privatization.
Law 13/1991 permitted "budgetary institutions" or "departments which co-ordinate
such institutions" (i.e., government ministries and other purely governmental organiza-
tions) to enter into collective labor contracts, "if the law provides that some rights of the
employees from these units shall be established by collective negotiations." Id. art.
20(1).
178. In the case of "budgetary institutions" or the departments that coordinate them,
the statute specified that "the managing bodies of the budgetary institutions, or of the
departments, as the case may be, shall represent the employers at the conclusion of the
collective labor contracts." Id. art. 20(2).
179. At the conclusion of the collective labor contract, the employees shall be rep-
resented by trade unions. In the enterprises in which trade unions have not
been organized, or in which, although organized, not all employees are members
of a trade union, or of the same trade union, the representatives of the employees
shall be elected by these ones, by secret ballot, on lists.
Law 13/1991, art. 7(2).
180. See Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 2(3) ("No one can be compelled to belong
or not belong to ... a trade union.").
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tors on contemporary Romanian labor law, 181 if Law 13/1991 had been
strictly applied, ad hoc elections to elect worker delegates would have been
required in virtually every work place.182 The result thus would have
resembled the "works council" institutions common elsewhere in Europe,
but rejected by Romania. 183
This is not what occurred in practice, however. Many trade union
leaders noted that the trade unions in the enterprise generally continued to
speak for their members at bargaining sessions and ad hoc elections were
only held to select representatives for non-union employees. Thus, the
actual collective negotiations were conducted between the enterprise man-
agers and an amalgam of trade union and ad hoc representatives. This
process often involved acrimonious disagreements about how many repre-
sentatives were allowed to participate and vote from the various employee
constituencies, as well as what level of agreement was necessary among the
parties for the collective labor contract to go into effect. 184
ii. Absence of a Duty to Negotiate
Even though the constitution purports to protect the right to organize and
bargain collectively,18 5 Law 13/1991 contained no specific statutory
requirement that any enterprise recognize a trade union as a representative
of its workers, negotiate with it, or enter a collective agreement. Article 6
merely stated that "collective labor contracts can be ('se pot') concluded at
the level of enterprises, groups of enterprises, [or] branches of activity
[industry level] as well as at national level."' 1 6 The use of permissive
rather than mandatory language was a strong indication that parties
unwilling to negotiate, much less agree upon, the terms of collective agree-
ments were not subject to legal sanction. The labor relations statutes
nowhere else recognized any express requirement that enterprises recog-
nize and bargain with trade unions, although it perhaps could be argued
that this expectation was implicit in the overall structure of the post-1989
laws.
Romanian jurists were divided concerning the duty of employers to
recognize and negotiate with trade unions under Law 13/1991. Ghimpu
181. BeligrAdeanu has authored numerous articles on labor law, both before and after
the fall of the communists. In the early 1990s, he compiled two authoritative annota-
tions of labor law: UNIUNEAJURI.SLOR DIN ROmANIA, CODUL MUNCH, supra note 16 (an
annotated Labor Code); and LEGISLATIA MUNCH 1990-1991 vols. I and 11 (1991, 1992)
(an annotated collection of labor statutes and decrees promulgated after December
1989).
182. See Serban BeligrAdeanu, fn LegAturd cu Problema Efectelor Contractelor Colec-
tive de MuncA Incheiate la Nivel National, de Ramura sau al Grupurilor de Unitati, DREP-
TUL, No. 5/1992, 33, 34.
183. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Dr. BeligrAdeanu argued that trade
union members selected in such ad hoc elections would not be representing employees
in their trade union status, but solely as individually-elected delegates. See BeligrAde-
anu, supra note 182, at 35.
184. See Interviews with representatives of trade union federations affiliated with
Blocul National Sindical, in Saturn, Romania (Aug. 12-17, 1995).
185. See 1991 CONST., supra note 9, art. 38.5.
186. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 6 (emphasis added).
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and Ticlea's leading labor law treatise, Dreptul Muncii,187 adopted the view
that no obligation to negotiate was imposed upon "the social partners"
(employers and employees) at any level of the economy, characterizing this
situation as a "legislative lacuna" that had to be eliminated.' 88
On the other hand, Dr. Gheorghe Brehoi, a frequent commentator on
labor law and a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection, concluded that while negotiations and actual entry into a col-
lective labor contract were mandatory at the enterprise level, they might not
be at the higher branch or national levels. 189 Brehoi noted that several
statutes require certain enterprise labor standards to be established by col-
lective negotiations, 190 reasoning that because "the mechanism for estab-
lishing and granting important personal rights cannot function in the
absence of a labor contract at the level of the enterprise, doubtless its con-
clusion is obligatory and neither of the parties - employers [or] employees
- can refuse to negotiate collectively for establishing its contents."191
Ghimpu and Ticlea rejected Dr. Brehoi's conclusions, in part because
Article 6 of Law 13/1991 contained no distinction between the various
levels at which negotiation could take place. Thus, they argued, the stat-
ute's internal structure did not permit the conclusion that reaching agree-
ment is obligatory only at the enterprise level. In addition, they urged that
because the law contained no express obligation to negotiate at all, a forti-
ori it could not be construed to require actual agreement on a contract.' 92
Notwithstanding the theoretical confusion, in practice state enter-
prises generally did negotiate with the trade unions represented among
their work forces. The situation in the emerging private sector was, how-
ever, more complicated. Some businesses accepted collective bargaining,
but others, especially some with foreign partners, are said to have
expressly conditioned their willingness to invest in Romania upon being
187. SANDA GHIMPU & ALEXANDRU TICLEA, DREPTUL MUNCh (1994).
188. See id. at 114.
189. See Gheorghe Brehoi, Contractele Colective de Muncd La Nivel National Pentru
Anul 1992, DREPTUL, No. 4/1992, 3, 5.
190. In Article 3(2) of Law 31/1991 ["Establishment of the Duration of Working
Time Under Eight Hours a Day for Employees Working Under Particular - Harmful,
Difficult, or Dangerous - Conditions"], the length of work time reduction and the iden-
tification of employees to benefit from it "shall be established by negotiations between
employers and trade unions, or the employees' representatives, as the case may be." Lege
privind stabilirea duratei timpului de muncd sub 8 ore pe zi pentru salariatii care
lucreaz5 in condiii deosebite - vhtdm~toare, grele sau periculoase, art. 3(2), No. 31,
Mar. 22, 1991, M.O., Part I, No. 64, Mar. 27, 1991. Similarly, in Article 5(1) of Law 6/
1992 ["Employees' Paid Holidays and Other Holidays"], rules concerning taking of paid
holidays "shall be established in the collective labor contract." Lege privind concediul
de odhind i alte concedii ale salariatilor, art. 5(1), No. 6, Feb. 5, 1992, M.O., Part I, No.
16, Feb. 10, 1992.
191. Brehoi, supra note 189, at 5.
192. See GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra note 187, at 114. Their survey of other nations also
led them to conclude that the majority of states with a tradition of collective bargaining
did not elevate the obligation to negotiate to a legal duty. See id.
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able to operate union-free. 193 As the private sector grew, it became even
more crucial to resolve the issue of whether there was a duty to negotiate.
iii. Unenforceability of Collective Labor Contracts at Enterprise Level
There were many problems associated with trade unions' efforts to enforce
collective labor contracts under Law 13/1991. This was an especially glar-
ing problem when national and industry-level contracts were ignored by
enterprises. Although the law could be read to make such contracts bind-
ing on enterprises within the relevant industry,194 Romanian labor law
experts reasoned that it could not have this effect, either in theory or prac-
tice.195 Because Article 4 mandated that the provisions of any contract
negotiated at the enterprise level had to apply to all enterprise employ-
ees,196 as a matter of law there could only be one collective bargaining
contract for the workers within a single enterprise. 197 At the same time, an
enterprise quite often would have employees who belonged to rival trade
unions, each of which were affiliated to different federations and/or con-
federations, which, in turn, might have negotiated rival industry and/or
national level agreements. The statute, by its silence, incongruously per-
mitted two or more contracts to exist simultaneously in any given branch
of industry and even at the national level.' 98 Thus, an enterprise could be
placed in the impossible position of simultaneously being subject to two or
more industry or national contracts - each allegedly binding and poten-
tially conflicting. For this reason, one commentator has concluded that
collective labor contracts above the enterprise level could not be seen as a
"source of law," but only as a "source of inspiration."'1 99
On the other hand, Law 13/1991 mandated that enterprise-level con-
tracts were legally binding and enforceable in the courts. 20 0 Nevertheless,
193. See Interview with leaders of "Electron" Federation, in Bucharest, Romania (June
23, 1993).
194. The statute impliedly rather than expressly bound enterprises to these "higher
level" contracts: it allowed for industry and national-level contracts; it made contract
compliance "compulsory for the parties;" and it specified that litigation concerning con-
tract compliance fell within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance. See Law 13/
1991, supra note 10, arts. 13, 17. The latter two provisions, as written, appeared to
apply to contracts at all levels, without distinction.
195. See GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra note 187, at 122-23; BeligrAdeanu, supra note 182, at
35-37.
196. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 4 ("The provisions of the collective labor con-
tract shall produce effects for all the employees in the enterprise, regardless of the date of
their hiring, or whether they were or were not affiliated to a trade union organization in
the enterprise.").
197. See Beligrhdeanu, supra note 182, at 34.
198. For example, there were three competing national level contracts in 1992. See id.
at 35.
199. [C]ollective labor contracts entered into at the national and branch level, etc.,
would not have the legal effect of other contracts - that of constituting a vincu-
lum juris [legal bond or tie] - but would represent, in essence, only a simple
optional source of inspiration for negotiation of collective labor contracts entered
into at the level of every enterprise, the only one which, legally, obligates the
parties who entered it (employers and the employees of the enterprises) ....
Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
200. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, arts. 13, 17; see supra note 190.
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Romanian trade union leaders claimed that managers frequently breached
their enterprise collective contracts and that the trade unions could not, as
a practical matter, respond by invoking judicial remedies.20 1 They gave
several reasons for this. First, the trade unionists simply did not trust the
quality of justice available in the courts; important cases would regularly
be decided in the way "the Power" wanted them to come out. Second, it
was very expensive to litigate; trade unions could not afford to sue for con-
tract breaches, especially given their claim that breaches occurred fre-
quently. Third, there was tremendous delay in the litigation process, and
trade union leaders often could not suffer the consequences of waiting for a
decision - particularly when the dispute was an urgent one.20 2 As a
result, leaders risked losing their members' support by going to court; the
members would perceive the leaders to be failures when, as was often the
case, no positive results were obtained after long delays and great
expense.203
iv. Legitimacy Questions Regarding National and Industry-Level
Collective Labor Contracts - the Problem of Freedom of Contract
Law 13/1991 established an extremely vague process for negotiating
national and industry-level agreements. All lawfully established trade
union federations (at the industry level) and confederations (at the
national level) were automatically entitled to participate in negotiations at
their respective levels, regardless of the size of their membership.20 4 The
statute did not provide any mechanisms for assuring that any of the com-
peting federations or confederations actually represented a significant pro-
portion of the employees within any given segment of the economy, nor did
it require coordinated bargaining or the production of a single contract at
industry or national level.
In 1992, competing confederations negotiated three separate national-
level contracts with the employer representatives. 20 5 Thereafter, the con-
federations cooperated in national-level negotiations, reaching agreement
on a single contract in 1993 and 1995 (no contract was agreed to in
201. See Bush, supra note 128, at 1.
202. See id. at 1-2. In 1995, the "Metal 93" federation attempted to convince the Min-
istry of Justice to establish a fast-track for handling labor litigation (hearing within 24
hours of filing), but no ministry action was ever taken; the proposal was taken for
"study" and disappeared. See id. at 2.
203. See id.
204. At the conclusion of the contracts... the employees shall be represented by
federation type trade union organizations, in cases in which the contracts shall
be concluded at the level of groups of enterprises or branches, or by confedera-
tion type trade union organizations, in cases in which the collective labor con-
tracts shall be concluded at national level.
Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 8(2).
A federation can be formed by two or more trade unions from the same branch; a
confederation can be created by two or more federations from different branches. There
is no requirement for a minimum number of members. See Law 54/1991, supra note 12,
art. 42(2),(3).
205. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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1994).206 The same practice was followed in 1996, but one of the most
powerful confederations, Cartel Alfa, refused to sign the final document
that year.20 7 However, their refusal to sign was not seen at the time as
preventing the contract from coming into force. 20 8
At the industry level, competing trade union federations reached a
modus vivendi in some instances. For example, in 1995 the metal trades
industry was represented by eleven federations, six of which were affiliated
with the National Union Bloc (BNS), and five of which were affiliated with
either CNSLR-Frhoa or Cartel Alfa. These federations coordinated their
collective bargaining efforts at the level of the industry agreement. 20 9 On
the other hand, some industries experienced fractious inter-union rela-
tions. The telecommunications industry (Romtelecom, a state autonomous
regime) had two competing federations that reportedly had great difficulty
cooperating; charges of bad faith and collusion with company officials
abounded.2 1 0
The situation was even worse on the employers' side in industry and
national negotiations. Under Law 13/1991, the employers' representatives
were persons named by the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try.21' Although the practice evolved into designating employer represent-
atives from the developing employer associations, massive confusion and
controversy over who should rightfully speak for management or the own-
ers of the state enterprises nevertheless persisted.
As discussed above, 212 the weight of authority suggested that the
higher level collective contracts were not legally enforceable against the
enterprises. Moreover, it would have been perfectly logical for enterprise
management to refuse to honor agreements purportedly entered by their
representatives on the grounds that the enterprise authorities never author-
ized such representation and that the actual enterprise managers never
agreed to be bound by the resulting contracts. 213 The owners of private
enterprises were even more likely to adopt this kind of position, especially
if they were not members of the employer associations named by the
Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce.
206. See GHIMPU & TICLEA, supra note 3, at 121-22 n.32.
207. See Confederatia Nationald Sindicatilor Libere din Romania, Contract Colectiv
de Muncd Unic la Nivel National 36-37 (1996) (presenting a copy of the 1996 national-
level contract; pages 36 and 37 contain photocopies of the signature pages for the con-
tract, on which the signature lines for Cartel Alfa representatives were blank).
208. See Ghimpu & Ticlea, supra note 3, at 121-22 n.32 (listing Cartel Alfa as one of
the five confederations party to the 1996 national contract).
209. See Bush, supra note 128, at 2.
210. See id.
211. Law 13/1991, supra note 10, art. 8(3).
212. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
213. In informal conversations the author had with Romanian trade union leaders
during the years 1993-1995, the latter occasionally mentioned that such positions were
sometimes taken by enterprise management.
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d. Law 130/1996
In response to its perceived inadequacies (though not necessarily those
identified in this article), Law 13/1991 was repealed on October 16, 1996,
and replaced by a new statute, Law 130/1996 (Law Concerning the Collec-
tive Labor Contract).2 14 This statute was the culmination of several years
of negotiations begun in 1994 by the major trade union confederations,
which had sought modifications in all of the labor relations statutes.
2 15
The structure of the new law retained the basic elements of Law 13/1991,
but refined them to rationalize and legitimize those aspects that were
unworkable or incoherent in the earlier statute. It also reflected the per-
spective of the largest trade union confederations, which favored a system
of national and branch-level contracts, but which sought to limit the trade
union organizations that would be authorized to negotiate to those that
were representative (i.e., themselves). In fact, the final statute contained a
great deal of the original agreement reached by the trade unions in tripar-
tite negotiations with the Government and employer representatives, albeit
with a number of controversial changes that were vigorously protested by
some labor organizations.2 16
President Iliescu and his party, who had been responsible for the orig-
inal round of labor legislation in 1991,217 approved Law 130/1996 during
their final days in power. However, the opposition leaders who came to
power following the November 1996 elections also supported Law 130/
1996.218 The new political leaders sought to make only minor statutory
modifications once taking office. In that spirit, the new government
passed Law 143/1997 (Law for Modifying and Completing Law 130/1996
Concerning the Collective Labor Contract).21 9
The following discussion will, for the most part, address Law 130/
1996 as modified in 1997. Law 130/1996 remains the official designation,
notwithstanding its subsequent amendment and republication.
2 20
Because the new law is in many respects designed as a more sophisticated
version of its predecessor, Law 13/1991, and because it retains much of
the latter's underlying vision concerning the central role of the social part-
ners, the same order of topics and problems discussed in connection with
Law 13/1991 will be taken up here.
214. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
215. In addition to reform of Law 13/1991, the major confederations were interested
in reforming Laws 15/1991, supra note 11, and 54/1991, supra note 12, as well as in
creating an Economic and Social Council and passing legislation to establish credible
employer associations.
216. See Letter from Departament Juridic BNS (the legal office of the National Trade
Union Bloc), to the author (May 10, 1996) (on file with the author) (listing BNS's objec-
tions to the version of Law 130/1996 passed by the Romanian Senate).
217. See Bush, supra note 1, 387-400 (describing the political setting in 1991 at the
time Law 13/1991 was promulgated).
218. For example, Alexandru Athanasiu, who was instrumental in the passage of Law
130/1996, was appointed Minister of Labor and Social Protection in the new govern-
ment formed after the 1996 elections. See infra note 243.
219. Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14.
220. See id.
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i. Trade Union Pluralism and Employee Representation at Enterprise
Level
As amended, Law 130/1996 - like Law 13/1991 - allows contracts to be
formed at four different levels - national, industry, groups of enterprises,
and the enterprise. 22 1 As in the old law, the parties remain the employers
(or employers' organizations) and the employees, although the statute now
specifies that the latter are to be "represented by the trade union or in
another way provided by law."2 22
Probably the most important innovation of Law 130/1996 is that it
restricts the right of participation in collective negotiations to organiza-
tions that are "representative," as defined by the statute. At the enterprise
level, a trade union is deemed representative in either of two ways - if at
least one-third of the employees in the enterprise are its members, 223 or if it
is affiliated with a representative federation or confederation.2 24 Ad hoc
employee delegates are elected only if there is no representative trade union
present in an enterprise.2 25 Law 130/1996 thus indisputably installs rep-
resentative trade unions, not elected employee delegates, as the preferred
employee representatives, eliminating the theoretical and practical
problems experienced under Law 13/1991 in this regard.
Law 130/1996 also preserves a regulated and restricted form of the
enterprise-level trade union pluralism that had arisen under the imprecise
provisions of Law 13/1991. Notwithstanding the potential difficulties and
uncertainties associated with trade union pluralism, it is a well-established
practice in Romania and one which the trade unions fought to preserve in
the new law. They almost lost it; Law 130/1996, as originally promul-
gated, required majority support ("at least 50%") in order for an enterprise
trade union to be representative and did not include the provision for
representativity based on affiliation. 22 6 Any trade union possessing major-
ity support ipso facto would have obtained an exclusive right to negotiate.
A majority support requirement could have effectively eliminated trade
union pluralism at the enterprise level by barring non-majority organiza-
tions from the collective negotiations process (although arguably they
could still have represented their members before the enterprise).
In recognizing trade union representativity based on either a one-third
support standard or by affiliation, the 1997 amendments to Law 130/1996
represent a victory for proponents of trade union pluralism. The amended
qualifications will enable many more enterprise trade unions to participate
221. See id. art. 10(1), (2).
222. Id. art. 1(1).
223. See id. art. 17(1)(c).
224. See id. art. 18(3). For a discussion of what constitutes a representative trade
union organization and employer association at higher levels, see infra notes 258-68 and
accompanying text.
225. See id. art. 20.
226. See Law 130/1996, supra note 13, art. 17. The ability to obtain representative
status by affiliation was not extended beyond the federations at the industry and groups
of enterprises levels. See id. art. 18.
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in collective negotiations and thus remain viable organizations with an
influential presence in the enterprise.
Law 130/1996 expressly mandates that there can be only one collec-
tive labor contract within an enterprise.227 Given that two or more repre-
sentative trade union organizations often will be participating in collective
bargaining as a result of the 1997 amendments, coordinating the negota-
tions and achieving agreement on contract terms will continue to be prob-
lematic. The law specifies little about how such multi-party negotiations
are to take place.
228
Even more troubling, under Law 130/1996, it appears that a single
unhappy participant can keep a contract from entering into force, notwith-
standing the fact that the other parties agreed on its contents. This would
be possible because no collective labor contract (at any of the four possible
levels) can take effect until the date of its registration in the appropriate
office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection.229 Contracts cannot
be registered if "they are not signed by all of the representatives of the par-
ties to the negotiations." 230 There are only two exceptions to this unsigned
contract rule: (1) where the non-signatory representatives, although
227. Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 11(1)(a), 11(2) (collective labor con-
tract clauses "produce effects ... for all employees within the enterprise, in the case of
collective labor contracts entered into at this level" and "[alt every one of the levels.., a
single collective labor contract is entered into.").
228. When enterprise negotiations are mandatory, they must take place annually. See
id. art. 3(2). The employer is expected to initiate negotiations, see id. art. 3(5), convene a
negotiation session within 15 days of receiving the trade union demands, see id. art.
4(1), and provide specified information to the trade unions that "must permit a compar-
ative analysis of the situation of the work place, of the classification of professions and
trades, of the level of salaries, of the length of work time and of the organizations of the
work program." Id. art. 4(2)(a).
Romania's neighbors have also wrestled with the collective negotiations problems aris-
ing from trade union pluralism at the enterprise level. In Hungary, which like Romania
mandates a single collective labor contract with every employer, there are complex rules
for determining which trade unions are authorized to negotiate: if there is a single trade
union, it may negotiate an agreement so long as its nominees received more than half of
all the votes in the works council election [hereinafter "the election"]; if there are two or
more trade unions, they all may join together to negotiate an agreement, as long as their
nominees collectively received more than half of the votes in the election; if all of the
trade unions cannot cooperate toward this end, those that are representative (i.e., their
nominees received at least 10% of the election votes) may do so collectively, so long as
their nominees have more than 50% of the election votes; if the representative trade
unions, acting together, cannot reach agreement with the enterprise on a contract, the
one among them (if any) whose nominees received more than 65% of the election votes
is authorized to contract alone; when there are one or more trade unions present, but
their nominees collectively did not receive more than half of the works council votes,
they are entitled to negotiate a contract, but it is then subject to approval in an employee
referendum before it can enter into effect. See Act No. XXII, 1992, §§ 29(2), 33,
reprinted in New PAnrrER's OF COLLECrIvE LABOR LAW, supra note 92, at 305, 316-17.
In Poland, it is equally cumbersome. See Act to Amend the Labour Code and Other
Acts in Respect of Collective Bargaining, Sept. 29, 1994, DZIENMK USTAw, Oct. 26, 1994,
No. 113, Text No. 547 § 241-25, reprinted in NEw PATrm'is OF CoLLEcTivE LABOR LAw,
supra note 92, at 481, 489-90 [hereinafter DzIENmK USTAW].
229. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 25(3).
230. Id. art. 26(1)c).
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invited, had not been present at the negotiations; or (2) where the non-
signatory representatives had participated in the negotiations and agreed
to the negotiated clauses, but then refused to sign the contract. 23 1 If a
contract was not signed by all of the representatives of the parties because
one of the participating representatives refused to accept it, it could not be
registered. 232 The absence of any provisions that could circumvent a sin-
gle party's ability to effectively "veto" a majority-approved contract could
prove to be a major flaw in the statutory system. There is rich potential for
frustrating successful collective bargaining, not only by trade unions (or
employer associations) willing to play "dog in the manger" for their own
purposes, but also through collusion between enterprise managers and
house trade unions (i.e., when the employers do not wish to enter a con-
tract but must negotiate with all of the trade unions present).23 3 Further-
more, this problem is not confined to enterprise-level bargaining but rather
could occur at any of the four levels for which bargaining is authorized.234
ii. A Limited Duty to Negotiate
Whereas Law 13/1991 did not address the issue of the duty to negotiate,
Law 130/1996 created a limited duty. The duty to negotiate does not exist
above enterprise level and applies only to the larger entities - those with
twenty-one or more employees.235 Even then, negotiations are mandatory
only when there is a representative trade union present or, if none are pres-
ent, when at least half of the employees have voted in an election to select
ad hoc bargaining delegates. 236
231. See id. art. 26(2).
232. This happened in 1996 when a major confederation refused to sign. See supra
note 207 and accompanying text.
233. Even if the employer is under a duty to negotiate in good faith, see infra notes
242-44 and accompanying text, it is not clear that such a duty would be implied against
a trade union. By way of comparison, Hungary's laws have explicitly extended the duty
to the trade unions: "Every trade union, represented with the employer, may participate
in the negotiations aimed at concluding the collective agreement and has to cooperate
with a view to the success of the negotiations." Act No. XXII, 1992, § 33(8), as amended by
Act No. XIII, 1993, reprinted in NEw PATTRr s OF COLLECTivE LABOR LAw, supra note 92,
at 317 (emphasis added).
234. It is also not unique to Romania. In Poland, where a comparable "signature
requirement" exists, one commentator has noted: "The law further requires that both
plant and supra-plant collective agreements must be signed by all unions who negotiated
the same. Its [sic] enough that a single union involved in the negotiations refuses to
accede to the agreement reached to prohibit conclusion of the same." M. Sewerynsky,
The Main Features of the 1994 Act, in NEw PATrERNs OF COLLECTnVE LABOUR LAw, supra
note 92, at 493.
235. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 3(1). This was the number in the
original act passed in October 1996, supra note 13. The trade unions pushed for a lower
limit equal to the smallest number of employees necessary to form a trade union under
Law 54/1991, i.e., 15. "Legea Contractului Colectiv de Munch-Lege Antisindicalh!,"
Memorandum from Dumitru Costin, President, Blocul National Sindical (BNS) to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Oct. 17, 1996 (on file with author).
The new Government, on the other hand, proposed to increase the minimum number to
50 employees, but this was rejected by Parliament. See Propuneri de Modificare §i Com-
pletare a Legii Nr. 130/1996 Privind Contractul Colectiv de Muncd (undated chart pre-
pared by BNS in early 1997) (on file with author).
236. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, arts. 17(1)c), 18(3) and 20.
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Romania borrowed this "duty to negotiate" standard from France.23 7
In doing so, however, it did not follow the French lead in extending it to
industry-wide negotiations. 23 8 Although the law does not mandate negoti-
ations at the higher levels, it obviously anticipates that such negotiations
will continue to take place, given its extensive regulation of upper-level
negotiations and the power accorded to the social partners to insert clauses
into the national and industry collective contracts that define and bind the
lower levels of negotiations.
23 9
The fate of smaller enterprises, i.e., those with less than twenty-one
employees, remains unclear. On one hand, the statute excludes them from
the bargaining sphere, absent voluntary participation by the employer.
2 40
On the other hand, there are still certain labor standards that Romanian
law presupposes will be established through collective negotiation.
24 1
Even where negotiations are mandatory, Law 130/1996 does not
impose a legal obligation to actually agree to the terms of a collective labor
contract;242 nor does it expressly require the parties to negotiate in good
faith. Nevertheless, Alexandru Athanasiu has argued that a duty to negoti-
ate in good faith would in fact exist by operation of general civil law princi-
ples.243 He has written that "the obligation to negotiate represents an
obligation of ['means'], of which adequate fulfillment is evaluated exclu-
sively from the perspective of the diligence put forth by the employer in
achieving a collective labor accord, not in the least in relation to the fact of
entering into a labor contract."244
237. See Alexandru Athanasiu, Legea Nr. 130/1996 Privind Contractul Colectiv de
Muncd, DEP'rUL, No. 3/1997, 1, 6 (specifically referencing articles 132-27, 132-28 and
132-29 of the 1989 Code du Travail).
238. See id. Athanasiu, who had a major influence on the content of Law 130/1996
and even more on the 1997 modifications thereto, see supra note 218, infra note 243,
wrote that limiting the duty to bargain to the enterprise level was done because "in the
future, the role of collective negotiations at the enterprise level must be of first impor-
tance in fashioning the legal status of employees, to the prejudice of national or industry
collective negotiations." Id. at 7.
239. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
240. A trade union could be formed in an enterprise with as few as 15 members. See
Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 2(2). No express legal provision would preclude such
a trade union, or even unorganized employees, from pressuring an employer to recognize
and bargain with them. See Law 15/1991, supra note 11, art. 2(1) and 24(1) (collective
labor disputes and strikes may be initiated to protect employees' professional, economic,
or social interests).
241. See supra note 187.
242. Failure to agree on a contract is dearly anticipated. The duty to bargain annu-
ally arises, among other times, "at least 12 months from the date of the preceding negoti-
ations which did not result in the conclusion of a collective labor contract .. " Law
130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 3(2)a). See also Athanasiu, supra note 237, at 7.
243. Athanasiu served as the President of the Chamber of Deputies' Committee of
Labor and Social Protection when Law 130/1996 originally was passed. Later, while
serving as Minister of Labor and Social Protection, he was also involved in passing modi-
fications to the law. See also supra note 218.
244. Athanasiu, supra note 237, at 6 (citation omitted). By way of comparison,
Poland has legislated unequivocally on this subject:
Each party shall be obligated to bargain in good faith and with respect of the
legitimate interests of the other party. This means, in particular:
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Although the statute penalizes employers who either fail or refuse to
initiate negotiations or to convene the parties following the trade union's
formulation of demands, 245 the penalties are too small to function as an
effective deterrent. The offense is punishable by a fine of approximately
$200-$400 - a negligible amount for an enterprise of any size.2 4 6 Beyond
this, the law provides no remedies for any party - enterprise or trade
union - unable to obtain meaningful bargaining from its "social
partner."2 47
iii. Enforceability of Collective Labor Contracts at the Enterprise Level
Under the amended statute, enterprises will now be bound by the provi-
sions of a national-level agreement, as well as any industry-level agreement
in their branch. They will no longer be potentially subject to multiple,
competing higher-level collective contracts, as under Law 13/1991. The
new law expressly states that there can be only one collective labor con-
tract at all levels of bargaining2 48 and that those contracts will "produce
effects... for all employees employed at enterprises" of the branch, in the
case of branch contracts, or in the entire country, in the case of national
level contracts. 24 9 It also prohibits creation of collective labor contract
"clauses that establish rights at a level below those established by collective
labor contracts entered into at a higher level"2 50 or individual labor con-
tract clauses with rights inferior to those contained in any of the relevant
(i) to make allowances for demands of a trade union organization justified by
the economic situation of workers;
(ii) to restrain from making demands which obviously exceed the financial pos-
sibilities of the employer;
(iii) to respect interests of workers not covered by the agreement.
DzIEaNIK USTAW, supra note 228, §§ 241- 43(1).
245. See Athanasiu, supra note 237, at 8 (citing U.S. law on good faith bargaining).
Penalties also might be extended to refusals to negotiate in good faith or to provide
information to the trade unions.
246. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 5 ("Nonfulfillment... of the[se]
obligations is... punishable by fines of 3,000,000-6,000,000 lei."). The value of the leu
has declined steadily since 1989. In 1999, one dollar was worth about 15,000 lei.
247. The statute envisions a private right of action only over matters that follow crea-
tion of a collective labor contract, i.e., execution, modification, suspension, or termina-
tion. See id. art. 34.
248. See id. art 11(2) ("At every one of the levels provided by art. 10 [i.e., enterprise,
groups of enterprises, branch and national] a single collective labor contract is entered
into.").
249. The clauses of the collective labor contracts produce effects
a) for all employees within the enterprise, in the case of collective labor contracts
entered into at this level;
b) for all employees employed at enterprises that are part of the group of enter-
prises for which the collective labor contract has been entered into at this level;
c) for all employees that are employed at all enterprises of the branch of activity
for which the collective labor contract is entered into;
d) for all employees that are employed at all enterprises in the country in the
case of the collective labor contracts at the national level.
Id. art. 11(1).
250. Id. art. 8(2).
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collective labor contracts.251
As in Law 13/1991, Law 130/1996 imposes a legal duty of contract
compliance on the parties - which presumably include those employees
and enterprises brought within a contract's reach by operation of law,
rather than agreement. 25 2 Law 130/1996 also retains the same dispute
resolution system, with jurisdiction falling to the courts of first instance.25 3
Thus, the practical problems of contract enforcement experienced by trade
unionists under Law 13/1991254 have not been addressed in the new law.
The Romanian Government has recently proposed the creation of
labor courts having jurisdiction to resolve conflicts concerning collective
labor contracts. Under the draft statute, specialized sections to adjudicate
labor conflicts would be established within the existing court structure. 25 5
Three-person panels - a professional judge and two assistant judges, one
representing employer associations and one representing trade unions -
would hear cases in the first instance.25 6
iv. Legitimacy Questions Regarding National and Industry-Level
Contracts - "Representatives" versus "Freedom of Contract"
The top-down system of labor relations characteristic of the communist era
remains more widespread in Romania than some Western observers might
wish. For example, the trade union confederations premised their reform
on such a system. Moreover, Mr. Athanasiu argued for retaining a modified
system of centralized labor relations in Law 130/1996, in part because it
would allow "the social partners" to create national and industry labor
standards equivalent to those that legislators might incorporate in a mod-
ern labor code.25 7
Law 130/1996 has significantly strengthened the legal status of
national- and industry-level collective negotiations by articulating concrete,
quantifiable criteria that employer associations and trade union federa-
tions and confederations must meet in order to qualify as representative
organizations. The statute further strengthens the status of negotiations by
251. See id. art. 8(3). In addition, it is specified that "[a]t the entry into the collective
labor contract, legal provisions have a minimal character for the contracting parties." Id.
art. 8(4).
252. See id. art. 30.
253. See id. art. 34.
254. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
255. See Draft, Lege privind unele msuri pentru organizarea instantelorjudechtore~ti
competente sd solutioneze conflictele de munca ["Law concerning measures for organiz-
ing the jurisdiction of courts competent to resolve labor conflicts"] arts. 1, 2 (on file
with author).
256. See id. art. 5.
257. See Interview with Alexandru Athanasiu, Labor Law Professor and opposition
deputy, Romanian Chamber of Deputies (Civic Alliance Party), Faculty of Law,
Buluvardul M. Kogrlniceanu no. 36-46, Bucharest, Romania (Nov. 2, 1995); interview
with Alexandru Athanasiu, supra note 17. Romania's communist-era Labor Code has
not yet been revised. At the latter interview, in March 1997, Mr. Athanasiu, by then the
Minister of Labor and Social Protection, said that he hoped to undertake a full-scale
revision of the Labor Code, but that it could not be done for several years. See id. He
appointed a committee in 1999 to begin drafting a new code.
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expressly granting to representative organizations the power to negotiate
binding industry- or nation-wide collective labor contracts that automati-
cally cover all workers 25 8 (and by implication at least, all employers) at
those levels.
The top-down paradigm2 59 that underlies Law 130/1996 (and that
was implicit in its predecessor, Law 13/1991) is relatively simple: the larg-
est trade union confederations and employer associations (representing
both private and public enterprises) negotiate a contract containing basic
labor standards for the entire national economy, to the extent that such
standards are not already specified by law. As a part of that contract, they
define and establish the structure in which the next level of collective nego-
tiations - the branch, or industry, level - will take place: "[t]hrough the
collective labor contract entered into at the national level, the parties estab-
lish the branches of activity of the national economy, and the criteria
according to which the enterprises take part in these branches on the basis
of the consultative advice of the National Commission of Statistics. ' '2 60
At the next level, the largest federations and employer associations in
each of the respective branches of the industry negotiate a single industry-
wide contract. The contract standards must be at least as stringent as
those of the national contract and must cover industry-specific issues not
addressed in the national contract. The contracting parties also must iden-
tify which enterprises fall within the contract's provisions.26 1 Finally, the
enterprises (either individually or as a group) negotiate their contracts with
the local representative trade unions or ad hoc employee delegates, again
258. See supra note 249. The trade unions did not want automatic coverage of all
employees at a given level. Under Law 13/1991, the trade unions had ensured that the
benefits of collective labor contracts would not accrue to employees unless they were
members of signatory trade unions or adhered to the contract and paid a fee to the trade
unions. See Athanasiu, supra note 237, at 9. See also Contractul Colectiv de Munca unic
la Nivel National art. 11 (1995) (on file with author)
At the entry into individual labor contracts of an employee who was not repre-
sented at the negotiation of the present national level collective labor contract,
he can adhere to its application if, in this sense, he makes a declaration accord-
ing to annex number 2 which is deposited with the trade unions affiliated with
the signatory confederations.
The "declaration" referred to in article 11 required the employee to agree to a monthly
deduction of fees from his salary, payable to the trade union. See id. Annex No. 2.
259. See, e.g., Athanasiu, supra note 237, at 15. Mr. Athanasiu speaks of
"encourag[ing] . . . the pyramidal structuring of trade unions and employer
associations."
260. Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 21.
261. See id. art. 13.
(1) The parties are obligated to specify, in every collective labor contract entered
into at the level of group of enterprises and branch of activity, the enterprises
included to which the negotiated clauses are applied.
(2) In the case of collective labor contracts entered into at the level of branches
of activity, their component enterprises are established and specified by the par-
ties that negotiated the collective labor contract, with due regard to the require-
ments of the present law.
Id. art. 13.
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using all the higher-level contracts in their hierarchy as the base upon
which to build the enterprise contract.
Eligibility to participate in the higher-level contract negotiations is
restricted to representative organizations, a feature not found in Law 13/
1991. To qualify as representative at the national level, an employers' asso-
ciation must include employers whose enterprises, when taken together,
(1). operate in at least half of Romania's local government units ("judets");
(2) are active in at least twenty-five percent of the existing branches of
industry; and (3) employ at least seven percent of the country's workers. 262
There are comparable requirements for a trade union confederation to be
representative at that national level: it must include trade union organiza-
tions that, when taken together, operate in at least half of Romania's judets,
are active in at least twenty-five percent of the existing branches of activity,
and have a membership at least equal to five percent of the national work
force.2 63
To be representative at the branch level, an employers' association
must either (1) represent employers whose enterprises include at least ten
percent of the number of employees in that branch, 26 4 or (2) be affiliated
with an employers' association that has established itself as representative
at the national level.2 65 The standards for a trade union federation to be
representative at this level are again comparable to those for employers'
associations: the membership of the component trade union organizations
must equal at least seven percent of the work force in the branch,2 66 and
the federation must be affiliated with a confederation that is representative
262. See id. art. 15(1)a). Three employer organizations qualified as representative
under Lav 130/1996 and signed the national level contract in December 1997: Con-
federatia Patronald din Industria RomAniei (CONPIROM - Employer Confederation of
Romanian Industry); Confederatia Nationald a Patronatului Romftn (C.N.P.R. -
National Confederation of the Romanian Employer); and, Consiliul National al
fntreprinderilor Private Mici §i Mijlocii din RomAnia (C.N.1.P.M.M.R. - National Coun-
cil of Small and Medium-sized Private Enterprises of Romania). Conventie privind
modificarea §i completarea contractului colectiv de muncA unic la nivel national,
prelungit pAnA la data de 31 mai 1998 conform art. 23(2) din Legea nr. 130/1996,
modificatA §i completati prin Legea nr. 143/1997, M.O., Part V, No. 2, at 17, Feb. 20,
1998 (agreement attached to Contractul Colectiv de Muncd Unic la Nivel National, supra
note 132, signed by the parties Dec. 12, 1997, to be effective until May 31, 1998) [here-
inafter Conventie].
263. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 17(1)(a). Six confederations quali-
fied as representative and signed the 1997 national level collective contract: Confedera-
tia Nationald a Sindicatelor Libere din Romania-Fr lia (C.N.S.L.R.-Frtia - National
Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Romania - Brotherhood); Confederatia Nation-
ala Sindicald "Cartel Alfa" (National Trade Union Confederation "Cartel Alfa"); Blocul
National Sindical (B.N.S. - National Trade Union Bloc); Confederatia Sindicatelor
Democratice din Rominia (C.S.D.R. - Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of
Romania); Conventia Confederatiior Sindicatelor Nealiniate (C.C.S.N. - Convention of
Confederations of Unaffiliated Trade Unions); and, Confederatia SindicalA "Meridian"
(Trade Union Confederation "Meridian"). See Conventie, supra note 262, at 17.
264. See Law 130/1996 (1997), supra note 14, art. 15(1)(b).
265. See id. art. 16 ("Representative employers' associations at the national level are
also representative at the level of the branches and of the groups of enterprises through
the agency of component federative type organizations.").
266. See id. art. 17(1)b).
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at the national level. In the latter case, the confederation itself, rather than
the member federation, would technically be representative at this level.2 67
The implications of this system of representative organizations are
sweeping. Employer associations and trade union confederations that are
representative at the national level will be able to set mandatory labor stan-
dards for all Romanian employers, including those that are not affiliated
with any of the nationally representative employer associations and whose
employees are not members of any trade unions affiliated with the nation-
ally representative confederations. The mandatory contract coverage
would include small businesses with no legal duty to negotiate at the enter-
prise level and presumably would also apply to government employees
insofar as the law permits them to engage in collective bargaining. 268
The implications of Law 130/1996's impact on unaffiliated employers
are nowhere more clear than in the 1998 national level collective contract's
provisions regarding the "collective negotiations fund." Article 99(2) of the
contract stipulates that "[e]nterprises that are not affiliated with employer
organizations signatory to the present collective labor contract will trans-
fer, in an obligatory manner, a contribution equivalent to 2,000 lei/
employee per year into the account of one of the representative employers'
confederations." 269
At the industry level, the effect is much the same as at the national
level. The representative organizations are the only entities authorized to
negotiate an industry-level contract. Once they have done so, every
employer identified as a member of that industry is automatically bound
by the contract, regardless of its actual affiliation to the negotiating parties.
The employees of "member" employers are likewise bound by industry-level
contracts.
267. See id. art. 18(1).
268. Law 130/1996 does not distinguish between state-owned commercial societies
and private ones. In regard to pure governmental entities ("budgetary institutions" in
Romanian terminology), the statute provides: "Collective labor contracts can also be
entered into for employees of budgetary institutions. Clauses cannot be negotiated
through these contracts concerning rights as to which the granting and the amount are
established through legal provisions." Id. art. 12(1).
269. Romanian national collective labor contracts are very comprehensive documents.
The 1996 contract (an extension of a contract negotiated under Law 13/1991, then mod-
ified and renewed under Law 130/1996 through May 31, 1998) established standards
regarding the following topics: time of work; working conditions and safety; indexation
and other factors affecting salary and benefits; holidays and leave time; contents of indi-
vidual labor contracts; regulation of professional qualifications; participation of trade
union representatives in enterprise administrative councils and access to enterprise
operating information; offices, furniture and other support enterprises to made available
to trade unions; automatic withholding and deposit of employee membership dues in
trade union accounts (with employee consent); prohibition of replacement workers dur-
ing collective labor conflicts; mandatory contents of enterprise contracts, including cer-
tain health-related travel expenses, child care and employee cafeterias; and, mandatory
employer contributions to a fund established to support collective negotiations. See
Contractul Colectiv de MuncA Unic la Nivel National art. 10, M.O., Part V, No. 2, Feb.
20, 1998, supra note 132. Id. at 10.
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Such a system dramatically stretches the concept of "contract," per-
haps to the breaking point. It differs significantly from Romania's pre-com-
munist collective labor contract law, which scrupulously adhered to
freedom of contract principles.270 Even more importantly, it goes further
than any other contemporary European labor relations system, and proba-
bly further than international labor standards will permit, in depriving
non-consenting employers and workers of their rights to contract.
The concept of representative trade union organizations is common in
European systems of collective bargaining,271 as is the practice of
"extending" branch-level contracts, i.e., making them applicable to enter-
prises that were not parties to the original contracts.272 Perhaps the lead-
ing example for present purposes is France, whose legal system has been,
and remains, the most important model for Romanian lawmakers. 273 The
French Code du Travail directly influenced much of Law 130/1996,274 and
270. In contrast, the 1929 law required actual assent to create a legally-binding
obligation:
The following are bound by the collective labor contract:
a) professional associations [i.e., trade unions] or groups of entrepreneurs or
wage earners who have committed themselves, either at the moment of conclud-
ing the contract, or later through adhesion, notifying the Chambers of Labor
where the contract is registered;
b) wage earners and entrepreneurs signatory to the contract as well as those
who give individual written mandate to negotiate in their name and for them;
c) vage earners or entrepreneurs who have not resigned from the association or
group to which they belong within 8 days from the date when notice was given
of the conclusion of the collective labor contract;
d) entrepreneurs who have adhered to the contract and have communicated this
adhesion to the Chamber of Labor which is in charge of the registration;
e) wage earners or entrepreneurs who join groups or professional associations
bound by the collective agreement.
1929 Labor Contracts Law, supra note 144, art. 108.
271. The practice is not limited to countries like France, whose laws speak explicitly
of this concept. See infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text. Representative trade
union organizations exist in Germany, although the term does not appear in German
legislation. See Franz Gamillscheg, Trade Union Representativity in German Law, in
LABOUR LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 75, 75 (J.R. Bel-
lace & M.G. Rood eds., 1997). The practice has also been adopted by other Central
European nations, such as Hungary, since 1989. But see infra note 296.
272. See Reinhold Fahlbeck, Collective Agreements: A Crossroad Between Public Law and
Private Law, COMP. LAB. LJ. 268 (1987). The author has not been able to identify any
European state that permits groups purporting to represent "the social partners," acting
alone, to negotiate agreements that bind all branches, enterprises and employees in the
state. To the extent that national level agreements exist, they tend to be tripartite
arrangements in which the government is a significant participant, thus giving them a
governmental regulatory nature. See generally Roger Blanpain, Belgium, in INT'L ENCYCL.
FOR LAB. L. AND IND. REL. (Roger Blanpain ed. 1985).
273. For example, the 1991 Romanian Constitution, supra note 9, was modeled on the
French one, establishing political, and some judicial, institutions that very closely
resemble their French counterparts.
274. For example, the language of Law 130/1996 art. 4, concerning the employer's
obligation to convene a bargaining session within 15 days of the date of the trade
union's formulation of its demands, as well as the information the employer is obligated
to furnish at that meeting, is taken almost verbatim from its French counterpart, CODE
DU TAVAL art. L.132-28 (Dalloz 1997).
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was the primary inspiration for its "representativity" provisions.2 7 5
In France, a trade union is deemed representative 27 6 on the national
level if it satisfies standards, not specified in the Code du Travail, regarding
size, independence, dues, experience, and length of existence, as well as its
"patriotic attitude during the occupation. ' 2 77 At lower levels (e.g., a region
or an industry), a trade union is representative (and therefore capable, inter
alia, of concluding a collective contract which can be extended) if it is affili-
ated with one of the nationally representative organizations, or if it has
"proven [its] representativity in the field of application of the contract or
agreement." 278 Thus, the French and Romanian laws for establishing rep-
resentative trade union status are much the same, except that Romania has
included precisely quantified criteria in its statute.
French and Romanian labor practices differ most notably in the appli-
cation of branch-level contracts2 79 to enterprises or workers that have not
agreed to be bound, either individually or through the agency of an
employers' association or a trade union to which they belong. In Romania
there is only one step, the branch-level negotiations among the qualifying
representative parties on both sides. The resulting contract is then auto-
matically applicable to all enterprises and workers identified as being
within that branch, without further administrative implementation or an
opportunity to be heard by interested parties. In contrast, in France, social
partners that negotiate the original contract bind only the enterprises that
actually agree to be bound, either by individual act or by membership in a
signatory employers' association. 280 In order for such a contract to
become legally binding upon an unconsenting employer, it first must qual-
ify for "extension."
To qualify for "extension," (1) both the employer organizations, as well
as the trade unions, must be "representative"; (2) the negotiations must
take place under the auspices of a joint commission convened by the Minis-
try of Labor and presided over by its representative; (3) the contract must
cover a branch or a defined inter-industrial segment of the economy, or a
275. Athanasiu, supra note 238, at 10 n.26.
276. Strictly speaking, the term used is "most representative," but it seems to mean
the same thing in practice. See MICHEL DESPAX &JAcQUEs RojOT, LABOUR LAW AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS IN FRANCE 159, 179-80 (1987).
277. C.TRAv. art. L.133-2. The last factor has been dropped from the analysis in prac-
tice. See DESPAX & ROJOT, supra note 276, at 160.
278. C.TRAv. art. L.132-2.
279. France does not have national-level contracts applicable to the entire economy;
the closest approximation to such contracts are the national inter-occupational
agreements.
280. A French industry-level collective labor contract (which has not been extended)
would bind: "the [trade] unions, employers' organizations, individual employers and
employer members of the organizations which signed it;" any of those groups that subse-
quently adhered to it; employers who affiliated with an organization bound by it; to
some extent, employers who have resigned from organizations bound by it; and "all the
employees of an employer bound by [it], whether unionised or not, and whether or not
their [trade] union has signed [it]." DESPAX & RojOT, supra note 277, at 254. Cf. C.TRAv.
art. L.132-9 (non-signatory employer associations or individual employers can adhere to
existing collective labor contracts).
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subcomponent thereof (the territorial scope can be national, regional or
local); and (4) the contract must contain contractual provisions regarding
topics specified in the Labor Code (e.g., free exercise of trade union rights
and employee freedom of opinion).281 Qualifying contracts do not auto-
matically cover all enterprises within their occupational and territorial
scope, however. In order for this to occur, they first must have been offi-
cially "extended."282
"Extension" is a completely separate process from the original contract
negotiation and conclusion. Whereas the latter is an affair solely between
consenting "social partners," the former is an official act of the French
Government, taken only after completing defined procedural steps, includ-
ing a right of notice and opportunity to be heard for those potentially
affected. 283
There is a vast difference between the French system of "extension," in
which only official acts of the government (with recourse to judicial
review) 28 4 can subject unconsenting employers to legal obligations, and
Romania's system, which grants such power directly to non-government
parties, affording no due process rights to the unconsenting employer or
trade union organizations and the workers they represent. The distinction
between the two countries' systems is of fundamental importance. In sim-
ple terms, the French two-step approach - private contract plus adminis-
trative extension - is consistent with international labor standards, while
the Romanian one-step approach - private contract binding nonconsent-
ing third parties - is not.
International standards for collective labor contracts are grounded on
the concept of "voluntary negotiations." 285 Furthermore, ILO Convention
281. See DEsPAx & Rojor, supra note 276, at 265-68.
282. C.Tav. arts. L.133-8 to 133-17.
283. The minister in charge, acting either on his own initiative or at the request of a
representative party, can initiate procedures whereby
the provisions of a branch contract or a professional or interprofessional agree-
ment . . . can be rendered obligatory for all the employees and employers
included in the field of application of the said contract or the said agreement, by
order of the Minister, after the reasoned opinion from the National Commission
for Collective Negotiation provided in article L. 136-1.
C.TRAv. art. L.133-8. Under the "extension" procedures, the Minister must not only take
into account the opinion of the National Commission for Collective Negotiation (a body
composed of several ministers, the President of the Social Section of the Conseil d'Etat,
plus an equal number of representatives from trade union organizations and employer
associations that are "the most representative at the national level," id. art. L. 136-1, but
must also precede his order with the official publication "of an opinion relative to the
extension or to the enlargement envisaged, inviting the interested organizations and per-
sons to make their observations." Id. art. L. 133-14.
284. The act of the Minister of Labor is subject to appeal in the French administrative
courts. See DEsPAx & Rojor, supra note 276, at 270.
285. See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 6, art. 4 ("Measures appropriate to
national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full
development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers
or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of
terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.") (emphasis
added).
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No. 154 clearly states that "[t]he measures taken with a view to promoting
collective bargaining shall not be so conceived or applied as to hamper the
freedom of collective bargaining."2 86 It could scarcely be considered "vol-
untary negotiations" or "freedom of collective bargaining" to bind an
employer or a group of workers to contracts negotiated by other private
persons or entities not authorized to speak for them. At the same time,
international labor standards do allow, and indeed encourage, "extension"
of collective labor contracts by act of government, implicitly recognizing
that there would be employers and workers who were not automatically
covered by the original privately-negotiated contract. 28 7
Although it is generally recognized that collective labor contracts can
have both contractual and legislative aspects,2 88 established international
standards demand some act by responsible government officials before the
private water is converted into public wine. Romania's delegation of law-
making authority to trade unions and employer associations therefore
might render this aspect of Law 130/1996 subject to successful objection
in one of several forums. A complaint could be brought before the ILO, 2 89
or perhaps even in the municipal courts of Romania under the provisions
of Articles 11 and 20 of the 1991 Constitution that incorporate interna-
tional treaties into municipal law.2 90 It is perhaps only a matter of time
before a private business enterprise or a trade union which cannot qualify
as representative incurs enough prejudice from one of these contracts to
make such a challenge.
286. ILO Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), supra note 6, art. 8.
287. The relevant ILO Recommendation provides:
(1) Where appropriate, having regard to established collective bargaining prac-
tice, measures, to be determined by national laws or regulations and suited to
the conditions of each country, should be taken to extend the application of all
or certain stipulations of a collective agreement to all the employers and workers
included within the industrial and territorial scope of the agreement.
(2) National laws or regulations may make the extension of a collective agree-
ment subject to the following, among other, conditions:
(a) that the collective agreement already covers a number of the employers and
workers concerned which is, in the opinion of the competent authority, suffi-
ciently representative;
(b) that, as a general rule, the request for extension of the agreement shall be
made by one or more organisations of workers or employers who are parties
to the agreement;
(c) that, prior to the extension of the agreement, the employers and workers to
whom the agreement would be made applicable by its extension should be
given an opportunity to submit their observations.
ILO Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), art. 5.
288. See, e.g., Fahlbeck, supra note 272.
289. Such complaints could be brought before the ILO Governing Body's Committee
on Freedom of Association. See Procedures of the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commis-
sion and the Committee on Freedom of Association for the Examination of Complaints Alleg-
ing Violations of Freedom of Association, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF
AsSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COM-
MITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE ILO ann. I (4th ed. 1996). Romania has already
come under the scrutiny of this body in cases filed since 1989. See supra notes 127, 140
and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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II. Recommended Modifications of Laws 54/1991 and 130/1996
At the beginning of this article, I suggested that Romania's legal framework
for labor relations should be coherent, fair and consistent with interna-
tional labor standards prevailing in Europe. In light of this, and the forego-
ing discussion, my recommendations for modifications to the present law
are both obvious and brief.
A. Law 54/1991
With regard to Law 54/1991 and the regulation of trade unions as organi-
zations, the two areas that need attention are: (a) the absence of prohibi-
tions against employer-dominated "house" trade unions; and (b) the
restriction of eligibility for trade union membership and office to "employ-
ees." In both cases, relatively simple modifications to Law 54/1991 would
bring the statute into line with ILO standards. With regard to "house"
trade unions, the language of Article 2 of ILO Convention 98 could be
incorporated into Article 1(2) which already mandates that, "trade unions
shall be independent of... any other organizations," 29 1 or into Article 48,
which establishes sanctions for, "interference with the exercise of the right
to free trade union organization or association."2 92 Thus amended, the
language of Law 54/1991 might read as follows:
[aicts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers' organiza-
tions under the domination of employers or employers' organizations, or to
support workers' organizations by financial or other means, with the object
of placing such organizations under the control of employers or employers'
organizations, shall be deemed an offense [punishable under Article 48].293
Injecting the ILO standard into the law should not jeopardize most of
the enterprise support currently provided to Romanian trade unions, as
long as it is given without discrimination.2 94 The ILO Committee on Free-
dom of Association has noted:
It is fairly common for legislation'or practice to contribute to the financing
of trade unions or to afford them certain advantages, such as premises or
facilities, which could involve the risk of interference or favouritism. In the
view of the Committee, while there is no objection in principle to an
employer expressing its recognition of a trade union as a social partner in
this manner, this should not have the effect of allowing the employer control
291. Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 1(2) ("Trade unions shall be independent of
State bodies, political parties, and of any other organizations.").
292. Id. art. 48(a). Such acts are deemed "offenses" ("infractiuni"), punishable by a
fine of 5,000-25,000 lei (a minuscule sum at present) or imprisonment from six months
to two years (certainly not an insignificant sanction). See id.
293. The bracketed words would be used if the modification were made in Article
1(2).
294. See supra note 132 (describing 1998 national level collective labor contract provi-
sions regarding employer obligation to make space and equipment available for trade
union use) and note 127 (recognizing that in 1992 and subsequent years, collective
labor contract clauses required employer impartiality in dealing with trade unions in an
enterprise).
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over a trade union, or favouring one trade union over another.295
Nor would having an anti-domination standard in Romanian law threaten
the existence of any given trade union. Romanian law does not permit the
State to dissolve a duly-registered trade union, even one that might be dom-
inated by an employer. 2 96 The only meaningful sanction under Article 48
of Law 54/199 (imprisonment) would be directed against individuals, not
organizations.
The other problem with Law 54/1991, i.e., denying membership or the
right to hold office to non-employees, involves two separate elements. In
regard to limitations on membership, Romania should be encouraged to
adopt a model of legal regulation that gives due respect for the role trade
unions should be expected to play in representing the interests of "working
people." One such example can be found in Polish law:
(1) Regardless of the nature of their employment contract, all workers, mem-
bers of agricultural production cooperatives, and those working under a
management contract, provided that they are not employers, have the right to
establish and join trade unions.
(2) Homeworkers have the right to join any trade union that functions in the
establishment with which they concluded the homework contract.
(3) Those persons referred to in subsections (1) and (2) do not lose the right
to belong to and join a trade union when they retire or receive a disability
pension.
(4) The unemployed, within the meaning of legal provisions on employment,
retain their right to belong to a trade union, and if they are not trade union
members, they have the right to join a trade union in compliance with the
by-laws of the trade union. 29 7
If Romania could be persuaded to adopt a version of the Polish model
for trade union membership, then all that would be necessary to create an
internationally acceptable requirement for holding trade union office
would be a modest revision of Law 54/1991 - namely, removing the
phrase "working in the enterprise" from Article 9.298 This would certainly
eliminate the most pernicious use of the current restriction - discharging
a trade union officer and then using his non-employment as a grounds for
refusing to recognize his capacity to speak for his trade union.
295. ILO Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: Protection against Acts of
Interference 11 229, 1994, Report III, Part 4B, 81st Session, International Labor
Conference.
296. See Law 54/1991, supra note 12, art. 40 ("Trade union organizations cannot be
dissolved and their activity cannot be suspended on the basis of orders issued by the
State administration bodies.").
297. Act of May 23, 1991, On Trade Unions, Sec. 2(1)-(4), DZIENNIK USTAW, supra
note 228, June 26, 1991, No. 55, pp. 725-730, Text No. 234.
298. The article would thus read, "In the leadership bodies can be elected Romanian
citizens who are members of the trade union possessing full exercise capability and not
serving one of the complementary penalties provided by the criminal law." Law 54/
1991, supra note 12, art. 9. This would still leave open the question of whether Article
9's requirements that officials be Romanian citizens and not be subject to certain crimi-
nal penalties are fully in compliance with international standards, a subject that is not
addressed herein.
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B. Law 130/1996
Law 130/1996 is, for the most part, well within the norms of Western
European industrial practice. However, the sweeping authority of represen-
tative trade unions and employer associations to automatically bind an
entire industry (or even the entire nation) by virtue of agreeing to an indus-
try- or national-level contract should be curtailed. 29 9 Romania should be
encouraged to implement the French model, in which trade union organi-
zations and employer associations may bind only their members to the
contracts they enter, and in which any "extension" of contract terms would
require a second step, administered by the government and open to partici-
pation by interested parties. Romania's neighbors - Hungary,300
Poland,30 1 and the Czech Republic30 2 - have all adopted this model. If
Romania would do so, non-consenting parties would no longer be deprived
299. The duty to bargain should also be expanded, both down to enterprises with 15
employees (the minimum number required to form a trade union under Law 54/1991),
as well as to the industry level, as is done in France. Additionally, it would be a good
idea to create a more meaningful standard of penalties for violation of the duty to bar-
gain, such as indexing the size of fines in some way that takes inflation into account.
300. § 34. (1) In response to a joint request of the contracting parties, the Minis-
ter of Labor may extend the effectiveness of the collective agreement to the entire
sector (sub-sector), provided that the organizations entering into such a contract
shall be deemed representative in the sector.
(2)-(5)(criteria to establish "representativeness")
(6) The Minister of Labour shall publish his resolution about the extension in
his official newspaper. Unless otherwise specified in the collective agreement,
such publishing shall be regarded as the announcement.
§ 35. Any trade union, representative organization of employers or employer,
governed by the collective agreement, may petition the extension of the collective
agreement by the Minister of Labor.
§ 36. (1) If there is no extension (§ 34), the collective agreement shall be effec-
tive for employers which
(a) concluded the collective agreement, or
(b) was (sic) members of the employers' representative organization at the
time the collective agreement was made, or
(c) joined the same later.
(2) When joining the organization as specified under Section (1)(c) above, the
trade union represented at the employer shall consent to extending the effective-
ness of such collective agreement to the employer.
(3) The collective agreement should specify which category of employers, listed
in Section (1)(b) above, is governed by it.
(4) The collective agreement shall be applied to the employees of the employers
governed by it, even though they may not be members of the trade union that
has entered into the collective agreement.
Act No. XXII of 1992, supra note 228, §§ 34-36.
301. See DZIENMNK Us-rAw, supra note 228, § 241-18. The section reads:
(1) Upon the request of a supra-enterprise trade union organization or an
employers' organization, the Minister of Labor and Social Policy may, after con-
sulting the organization which is entitled to conclude a supra-enterprise agree-
ment with the requesting organization, extend by order the scope of application
of a supra-enterprise agreement, or parts of it, to workers who are not covered by
any agreement, in the event that this is dictated by an important social interest.
The extension of the scope of application of a supra-enterprise agreement shall
be effective only until these workers are covered by another supra-enterprise
agreement.
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of their freedom of contract rights, and individual representative parties
could not paralyze entire industries by refusing to agree to a contract the
other parties wish to enter.303
Conclusion
Romania's collective labor relations law is a work in progress. Romania is
beginning to bring its trade union practice more in line with internation-
ally-recognized standards by eliminating inefficient and outdated norms
and procedures. The suggestions for change noted in this article are
respectfully intended to further the same end. While significant, these pro-
posed changes would not deflect Romania from its chosen course. Rather,
if adopted they would help to ensure that the "social partners" - trade
unions, employers and employer associations - could carry out their roles
in an even more meaningful, acceptable, and ultimately more enforceable
manner.
(2) In the event that a request to desist from extending the application of an
agreement is submitted, the first sentence of subsection (1), shall apply mutatis
mutandis ....
Id.
302. See Act N. 2/1991 O.G., Dec. 4, 1990, on Collective Bargaining art. 7, reprinted
in NEw PATTRNS OF COLLECriVE LABOR LAw, supra note 92, at 229, 231. This section,
promulgated before the Czech Republic and Slovakia separated, read in full:
(1) The Ministry of Labour and Welfare of the Republic may stipulate, by legal
provision, that the collective agreement of a higher degree shall be binding also
for employers who are not members of the employers organization concluding
the agreement.
(2) The binding effect of the collective agreement of a higher degree may be
extended, under the preceding article, only to cover employers pursuing similar
activities under similar economic and social conditions, based on the territory
of the respective republic and not bound by the collective agreement of a higher
degree.
Id.
303. Admittedly, this "paralysis" would still exist at the enterprise level, but perhaps
this is the price that must be paid in order to maintain the version of trade union plural-
ism that Romania has adopted.
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